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Abstract 
Many new and expensive drugs have been introduced in the past 10 years. However, at the 
time of introduction, the effectiveness of these drugs outside of clinical trials is often 
unknown. This creates a risk to third-party payers, as the outcome of these drugs in real-
world practice is uncertain at the time of introduction. A pay-for-performance risk-sharing 
agreement is a type of contract that shares part of this risk with the manufacturer by linking 
the performance of a drug to the manufacturer’s revenue. This dissertation consists of three 
essays to examine the performance of two types of pharmaceutical pay-for-performance risk-
sharing agreements.   
In my first essay I examine the performance of a pay-for-performance risk-sharing agreement 
in which patients are assessed at some evaluation time to determine their response to the 
drug. The manufacturer rebates to the payer a proportion of the sales from all patients 
excluding the sales from those responding at the evaluation time. I model disease progression 
using a continuous time Markov chain with uncertain transition rates. I address the following 
questions regarding the performance of this agreement: What is the optimum evaluation time 
and under what conditions will the manufacturer make a profit? What is the distribution of 
the manufacturer’s profit resulting from different sources of uncertainty? 
In the second essay I extend the model developed in the first essay to calculate the net 
monetary benefits of the payer and identify the conditions under which both parties have 
incentives to introduce the new drug.  
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The third essay focuses on the analysis of a risk-sharing agreement in which patients are 
prescribed a drug only if their probability of response lies within a range of success 
probabilities. The payer determines this range such that the use of the drug is cost-effective. I 
generalize from the existing literature by allowing the rebate to be different from the price of 
the drug and incorporating two types of administrative costs. I seek to answer two important 
policy questions: First, under what conditions does the payer benefit from the agreement? 
Second, under what conditions does the agreement become welfare-improving? 
Keywords 
Risk-sharing, Pay-for-performance, Pharmaceutical, Healthcare, Disease Progression Model, 
Net Monetary Benefit, Operations Research, Management Science, Health Economics  
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Introduction 
When a new pharmaceutical treatment is introduced by a drug manufacturer, insurance 
providers, also known as “third-party payers” or “payers”, need to decide whether to cover it 
for reimbursement. Those treatments approved for reimbursement are included in a list called 
formulary. Owing to the rising expenditures on pharmaceuticals in general and on the 
personalized and specialized drugs in particular,  the decision criteria for adding new drugs 
on formularies have evolved by including economic considerations into the evaluation 
process in addition to the clinical merits (Hoffman et al., 2012; OECD, 2005). For instance in 
Australia the cost-effectiveness assessment is called a “fourth hurdle” process - in addition to 
safety, efficacy, and quality- for adding new drugs to the national formulary (Lopert and 
Elshaug, 2013).  
Some countries with publicly funded healthcare have established agencies to determine 
whether new pharmaceutical treatments should be listed in public formularies. Examples of 
such agencies are National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) in the UK and 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee (PABC) in Australia.  
In Canada, every province or territory has its own publicly funded drug plan. For instance, 
the Ontario Drug Benefit (ODB) program covers most of the cost of 3,800 prescription drug 
products listed on the ODB formulary (MOHLTC, 2014). In 2002 the Common Drug Review 
(CDR) process was established at the Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technologies in 
Health (CADTH). According to CADTH, the following objectives are defined for CDR 
process:  to reduce duplication of reviews by jurisdictions, to provide equal access to timely, 
evidence-based information, and to consolidate the submission filing process for 
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pharmaceutical manufacturers. CDR also provides formulary listing recommendations to the 
participating federal, provincial, and territorial publicly funded drug plans (CADTH, 2014; 
Clement et al., 2009).  
Contrariwise, there is no national agency yet in the US to provide cost-effectiveness review 
for formulary listing decisions although a US legislation was introduced in 2008 to create a 
public-private comparative effectiveness institute (NIH, 2014; Clement et al., 2009).  
However, formularies as well as pharmacy and therapeutic committees that oversee them are 
present in US hospitals and outpatient drug plans (Schiff et al., 2012).  
The composition of committees that oversee the formularies can vary across jurisdictions. 
The Medical Technologies Advisory Committee (MTAC) that advises NICE on coverage 
decisions is composed of 25 independent specialists in medical technology and health 
economics. Additionally for each technology assessment, a lead team of 8 members 
including analysts, advisors, and patient experts will be assigned (NICE, 2013). On the other 
hand, the Canadian Drug Expert Committee (CDEC), which is the advisory body to 
CADTH’s CDR process, is composed of 9 specialists in medical technology and health 
economics and 2 members of the public (CADTH, 2014; Clement et al., 2009). 
Expensive Drugs with Unproven Effectiveness 
In the past 10 years several expensive drugs have been introduced into the pharmaceutical 
market. Some examples include carfilzomib for relapsed and refractory multiple myeloma, 
costing $10,000 (USD) per 28-day cycle (Stenger, 2012); pralatrexate for patients with 
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relapsed or refractory peripheral T-cell lymphoma, costing $67,500 (USD) per each 7-week 
cycle (Hui et al., 2012); and bevacizumab for the treatment of breast, colon, lung, and brain 
cancer, costing up to $100,000 (USD) a year (Jirillo et al., 2008). At the time of introduction, 
the effectiveness of these drugs has been shown within clinical trials. Thus, the outcome of 
these drugs is uncertain in real-world practice ex-ante (Mullins et al., 2010). Third-party 
payers are concerned about this uncertainty when making formulary listing decisions. This is 
owing to the fact that there is a risk of making a type I error, i.e., incorrectly paying for a 
costly drug (or treatment) whose incremental benefit is not worth the additional cost (Towse 
and Garrison, 2010).  
When facing this uncertainty, a risk-averse payer has several options. Eckermann and Willan 
(2007) suggest the following set of alternatives: 1) Adopt the new treatment irreversibly (e.g., 
by including it on the formulary). 2) Adopt the new treatment but seek more evidence, 
implying that the decision can be reversed if there is not enough evidence to support the cost-
effectiveness of the new treatment. 3) Decline to adopt the treatment and wait for further 
evidence. Towse and Garrison (2010) identify “risk sharing” as a fourth option, where the 
payer adopts the new treatment and at the same time links collected evidence on the 
performance of the treatment to the manufacturer’s revenues through a contract. 
Performance-based risk-sharing can also be attractive to the manufacturer, as it signals 
confidence in product quality when the product quality is not fully observable to the decision 
maker or payer (Cook et al., 2008).  
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In the context of this dissertation, I define a “pay-for-performance risk-sharing agreement” as 
a contract between a healthcare payer and a drug manufacturer in which a healthcare payer 
agrees to pay for a medicine based on a successful or agreed-upon clinical outcome. If the 
outcome is unsuccessful, then the payer must be reimbursed according to the conditions 
specified in the risk-sharing agreement.  
There are several types of risk-sharing agreements. Adamski et al. (2010) provide a detailed 
review of the risk-sharing agreements implemented globally, and Carlson et al. (2010) 
provide a taxonomy of performance-based reimbursement schemes between healthcare 
payers and manufacturers. Each type of risk-sharing agreement has unique mechanics, 
including the set of contract parameters that generate the specific dynamics for that 
agreement. Zaric et al. (2013) provide a literature review on risk-sharing agreements 
modeling. They present several examples of different types of risk-sharing schemes 
illustrating the broad scope of these types of contracts.  
Pay-for-performance Risk-sharing Examples 
I provide a short description of some examples of risk-sharing agreements implemented in 
the UK, the US, and Italy. 
Bortezomib for Multiple Myeloma 
The National Health Service (NHS) in the UK and the drug manufacturer for bortezomib 
entered into a risk-sharing agreement in 2007. Under this agreement, the NHS agreed to pay 
for four cycles of treatment for patients suffering from multiple myeloma who met the 
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following criteria: 1) Bone transplant was not a treatment option. 2) At least one other 
treatment had been unsuccessful. After four cycles of treatment, the impact of treatment was 
measured by a serum monoclonal protein (M protein) test. If the test demonstrated 
effectiveness (defined for this agreement as a 50% or more reduction in M protein), then 
treatment could be continued and further cycles would be funded by the NHS. However, if 
the treatment was not successful, then it would be stopped, and the drug manufacturer would 
reimburse the NHS for the cost of the first four cycles (NICE, 2007).  
Under this risk-sharing scheme the list price of ₤762 per 3.5 mg vial of bortezomib was not 
affected, although the effective price paid to the manufacturer by the NHS was close to ₤300 
for the first four cycles of treatment (Carlson et al., 2010). This was owing to the fact that 
about 60% of patients did not respond to the drug (Richardson et al., 2003) and therefore the 
total sales for those non-responding patients were rebated.   
Beta Interferon and Glatiramer Acetate for Multiple Sclerosis  
In 2002, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence of the UK recommended that 
beta interferon and glatiramer acetate should not be used by the NHS for the treatment of 
multiple sclerosis (MS) because of uncertainty in the long-term cost-effectiveness of those 
drugs (NICE, 2002). Against this backdrop, the UK government and several drug 
manufacturers entered into a risk-sharing agreement that allowed coverage of these drugs for 
the treatment of MS conditional on a 10-year monitoring study to collect data on the 
progression of disease in treated patients. According to this scheme, the collected data would 
be reviewed every two years and, based on the effectiveness results for every individual drug, 
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the drug manufacturers agreed to adjust the drug price to the NHS to ensure a maximum cost-
effectiveness ratio of ₤36,000 per quality-adjusted life year evaluated over a 20-year horizon 
(Boggild et al., 2009; HSC, 2002).    
Gene-expression Profiling Test 
In 2007, United Healthcare in the US and Genomic Health entered into a performance-based 
agreement for a gene-expression profiling test priced at $3,460 (USD) per test. The test is 
designed to identify for women with breast cancer for whom chemotherapy would be 
unlikely to be beneficial (NIH, 2007). According to this risk-sharing scheme, both parties 
would monitor the results and, if a large number of patients for whom chemotherapy was not 
beneficial were still receiving the treatment, then they would renegotiate the price (Cook et 
al., 2008).  
Nilotinib for Chronic Myeloid Leukemia 
Based on a performance-based risk-sharing agreement with the Italian Medicines Agency in 
2009, the drug manufacturer for nilotinib, a drug used for the treatment of chronic myeloid 
leukemia, agreed to refund the cost of the drug for every patient with an unsuccessful agreed-
upon hematological response after one month (Carlson et al., 2010).   
Lenalidomide for Multiple Myeloma 
As part of a risk-sharing scheme agreed to in 2009 between the NHS and the manufacturer of 
lenalidomide for the treatment of multiple myeloma, the manufacturer will meet the cost of 
the drug after 26 cycles for patients who still remain on the treatment (NICE, 2009).  
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Media Coverage of Risk-Sharing 
Prominent media coverage of the pay-for-performance risk-sharing agreements outlines the 
debate about the merits of these types of contracts. For example, the risk-sharing schemes for 
beta interferon, bortezomib, and lenalidomide were broadly covered by the media in the UK 
(BBC News, 2009; BBC News, 2007; BBC News, 2002). In an interview with a medical 
expert regarding the risk-sharing scheme for lenalidomide, the scheme was presented as the 
type of model that should be used for other drugs going forward (BBC News, 2009).  
On the academic side there is increasing attention to these agreements within the literature. 
Carlson et al. (2010), for example, see a promising future for performance-based risk-sharing 
agreements owing to the increasing number of these agreements implemented over the past 
10 years. There are, however, challenges with regard to the successful implementation of 
these agreements. Neumann et al. (2011), for example, see “high transaction costs, the lack 
of acceptable outcome metrics, difficulties in determining treatment effects, and the absence 
of suitable data capture systems” as some of those challenges involved. Towse and Garrison 
(2010) agree that in principle risk-sharing can increase overall efficiency by providing 
manufacturers and payers with real options. However, they believe it is too early to conclude 
that the recent interest in these agreements will become a trend owing to the lack of empirical 
evidence on the success of the on-going schemes.  
Overview of Thesis and Specific Essays 
Given the diversity and complex dynamics of pay-for-performance risk-sharing schemes, the 
optimal solution for the payer or the drug manufacturer may not be obvious. Providing 
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insight into the dynamics of these agreements can lead to designing contractual solutions that 
render the use of these new expensive drugs cost-effective. Motivated by this idea, in this 
dissertation I examine the performance of two distinct types of health-based pharmaceutical 
pay-for-performance risk-sharing agreements.  
The first type is based on the bortezomib risk-sharing scheme in the UK. In the first essay I 
examine the performance of a risk-sharing agreement similar to the bortezomib agreement 
from the perspective of the manufacturer. I assume that under this agreement, patients are 
assessed at some evaluation time to determine whether they are responding to the drug. The 
drug manufacturer rebates to the payer a proportion of the sales to non-responding patients. I 
use an underlying disease progression model to calculate the proportions (or numbers) of 
patients in each health state at each point of time. To incorporate uncertainty due to 
imprecision in measuring the response of patients to the drug, I use a continuous time 
Markov chain (CTMC) with three health states: “Sick”, “Responding to drug”, and 
“Progression of disease”. By using the proportions of patients in each state at each point in 
time, I obtain the profit function and establish the optimization problem for the manufacturer. 
Then I address the following specific questions with regard to the performance of this risk-
sharing agreement: What is the optimum evaluation time for the manufacturer if the rebate 
rate has been set by the healthcare payer? Under what conditions will the drug manufacturer 
make a profit? What is the distribution of the drug manufacturer’s profit resulting from 
different sources of uncertainty? I illustrate analytical findings with a numerical model 
parameterized using data from the bortezomib phase II clinical trial (Richardson et al., 2003) 
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and perform a detailed sensitivity analysis for the manufacturer’s optimal profit and optimal 
evaluation time with respect to the model parameters including the CTMC transition rates.  
In the second essay I examine the performance of the bortezomib agreement from the payer’s 
perspective. I extend the disease progression model developed in the first essay by adding a 
new state (i.e., “Death”) and calculate the net monetary benefits of the payer that result from 
the risk-sharing agreement. Adding this new state enables the calculation of the cost and 
benefit of the new treatment for those patients for whom disease has progressed. I simplify 
and approximate the model by using a system of ordinary differential equations to calculate 
the proportions of patients in each health state at each point in time. I establish the 
optimization problem for the payer and identify the conditions under which both the payer 
and the pharmaceutical firm have incentives to introduce the new drug. I also investigate how 
different classifications of rebates for non-respondent patients affect the two parties. 
In the third essay I discuss the second type of pay-for-performance risk-sharing agreement, 
which is based on a stylized model. Under this model, patients are prescribed a drug only if 
their probability of response to the drug lies within a range of probabilities of success 
between a lower and an upper cut-off probability. The payer determines these cut-off 
probabilities such that the use of the drug becomes cost-effective. The pharmaceutical firm 
provides the payer with a rebate for patients who do not respond to the drug. I generalize on 
Barros (2011) by means of allowing the rebate to be different from the price of the drug and 
by incorporating two types of administrative costs. To model patients’ response to the drug, I 
use a simple disease progression model consisting of two states, i.e., response and failure.  
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I formulate the problem as a Stackelberg game in which the manufacturer acts as the leader 
and determines the optimal price for the drug to maximize its expected profit. Then the payer 
chooses the optimal cut-off probabilities to maximize its expected payoff. The problem is 
solved in reverse time sequence. Thus, in the first step of the analysis, I find the optimal 
decisions by the payer (i.e., cut-off probabilities) for a given price by solving the payer’s 
optimization problem. In the second step of the analysis I find the drug manufacturer’s 
optimal price for given optimal cut-off probabilities by solving the manufacturer’s 
optimization problem. Then I seek to answer two important policy questions: First, does the 
payer benefit from the risk-sharing agreement? Second, is the risk-sharing agreement 
welfare-improving? I continue further by examining how administrative costs and 
distribution of the probability of response would affect the welfare-improving status of this 
type of risk-sharing compared with no risk-sharing. 
In the final chapter of the thesis I give an overview of the main results from the analysis of 
the risk-sharing agreements discussed in this thesis and highlight the policy implications of 
their implementation. Then I conclude with a few suggestions on the directions for future 
research. 
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Chapter 1  
1 Health-based Pharmaceutical Pay-for-performance 
Risk-sharing Agreements 
Many new drugs, such as biologics and cancer drugs, are very costly. However, their 
effectiveness outside of clinical trial settings is often uncertain at the time they gain 
market approval. This uncertainty may reflect a lack of real-world outcomes data, as 
opposed to clinical trial data, for a typical patient population. A risk-sharing agreement is 
a contract between a drug manufacturer and a healthcare payer to help manage 
uncertainties regarding the cost and effectiveness of those drugs. In this chapter, I model 
a risk-sharing agreement in which a proportion of total sales is rebated. I model disease 
progression using a continuous time Markov chain (CTMC) with uncertain transition 
rates. I examine the performance of this risk-sharing agreement from the manufacturer’s 
perspective and investigate the conditions under which the manufacturer will make a 
profit. I illustrate with a numerical model parameterized using data from a phase 2 
clinical trial of an oncology drug that was subjected to a risk-sharing agreement in the 
UK.  
1.1 Introduction 
In October 2006, the UK National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) 
recommended against coverage by the National Health Service (NHS) of the drug 
bortezomib (Velcade) for the treatment of multiple myeloma owing to its high price 
(BBC News, 2006; NICE, 2006). The manufacturer of the drug chose not to reduce the 
drug price but instead proposed to reimburse drug sales for those patients who did not 
show a meaningful clinical response (Garber and McClellan, 2007).  
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As a result, the NHS and the drug manufacturer entered into a pay-for-performance risk-
sharing agreement in 2007. Under this agreement, the NHS agreed to pay for four cycles 
of treatment for patients suffering from multiple myeloma who met the following criteria: 
1) Bone transplant was not a treatment option. 2) At least one other treatment had been 
unsuccessful. After four cycles of treatment, the impact of treatment was measured by a 
serum monoclonal protein (M protein) test. If the test showed effectiveness (defined for 
this agreement as a 50% or more reduction in M protein), then treatment could be 
continued and further cycles would be funded by the NHS. However, if the treatment was 
not successful, then it would be stopped, and the drug manufacturer would reimburse the 
NHS for the cost of the first four cycles (NICE, 2007).  
 A growing number of drugs that use advanced molecular biologic techniques 
(“biologics”) are being introduced into the pharmaceutical market. These drugs often 
have list prices of several thousand to several hundred thousand dollars per patient per 
year. Some examples include trastuzumab (Herceptin), which is used to treat breast 
cancer, with an annual treatment cost of $48,000 (USD) per patient (FTC, 2009); 
bevacizumab (Avastin), which is used to treat colorectal cancer, with an annual treatment 
cost of $100,000 (USD) per patient (Sahr, 2009); and imiglucerase (Cerezyme), which is 
used to treat the metabolic disorder Gaucher’s disease, with annual treatment costs of 
over $300,000 (USD) (Sahr, 2009).  
At the time of the introduction of many of these drugs to the market, their effectiveness 
outside of clinical trial conditions is uncertain. Thus, when making funding decisions for 
these new drugs, this uncertainty creates the risk for the healthcare payers that the 
incremental benefits gained from these drugs will not be worth the additional cost. Pay-
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for-performance has become an option for payers to manage this risk (Adamski et al., 
2010). Under this model, a healthcare payer agrees to pay for a medicine based on a 
successful or agreed-upon clinical outcome. If the outcome is not achieved, then the 
payer must be reimbursed according to the conditions specified in the risk-sharing 
agreement between the payer and the drug manufacturer. 
In this chapter, I model a risk-sharing scheme in which a proportion of total sales is 
rebated. I model disease progression and response to the drug with a CTMC. I assume 
that those who are responding to the drug at the evaluation time are eligible to continue 
receiving the drug, while a rebate is paid for all other individuals. I address the following 
specific questions with regard to the performance of this risk-sharing agreement, from the 
perspective of the drug manufacturer: What is the optimum evaluation time if the rebate 
rate has been set by the healthcare payer? Under what conditions will the drug 
manufacturer make a profit? What is the distribution of the drug manufacturer’s profit 
resulting from different sources of uncertainty? 
1.2 Related Literature 
There are several types of risk-sharing agreements. Adamski et al. (2010) provide a 
detailed review of the risk-sharing agreements implemented globally, and Carlson et al. 
(2010) provide a taxonomy of performance-based reimbursement schemes between 
healthcare payers and manufacturers. Zaric et al. (2013) review some of the literature on 
risk-sharing agreement modeling, and they give examples of different types of risk-
sharing schemes as an indication of the broadness of these types of contracts. Although 
risk-sharing agreements are becoming more common, only limited academic research 
exists on this subject. I identify two groups of papers on the subject: the first group 
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investigates risk-sharing agreements that are based on health outcomes, and the second 
group investigates agreements that are based on non-health outcomes, such as the drug’s 
market share, sales volume, or duration of treatment.  
1.2.1 Risk-sharing Based on Health Outcomes 
Gandjour (2009) considered a risk-sharing agreement where a payer, who is risk-neutral 
in cost but risk-averse in health benefits, pays a discounted price when the observed 
effectiveness is less than expected. Zaric and Xie (2009) developed two-period models to 
compare two risk-sharing arrangements when there is uncertainty about the effectiveness 
of the new drug. In the first model, risk-sharing is operationalized by requiring the drug 
be pulled from the market if the net monetary benefit (NMB) is negative in the first 
period. In the second model, risk-sharing is operationalized by requiring the manufacturer 
to pay a rebate to the healthcare payer in each period when negative NMBs are observed. 
Zaric and Xie (2009) showed that the relative performance of the two arrangements 
depends on several factors and that neither arrangement is always preferred.  
Lilico (2003) modeled the health benefits of a drug through lost earnings due to illness 
and calculated the utility to patients under two scenarios: with and without risk-sharing. 
He assumed that patients are risk-averse, that the pharmaceutical firm is risk-neutral 
seeking to maximize its profit, and that there is uncertainty regarding treatment outcomes. 
He investigated the conditions under which risk-sharing leads to increased profit for the 
firm and increased welfare for patients. He concluded that under risk-sharing firms get 
increased profit and patients get increased welfare, and that the gains are greater when the 
disease is harder to cure or when it takes longer to cure. 
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Barros (2011) analyzed the interactions between the NHS and the pharmaceutical 
industry with and without risk-sharing. The author developed a simple disease 
progression model, where patients respond successfully with probability π to a new 
treatment with a benefit b>0. He assumed the price is set by the drug manufacturer and 
calculated the utility for the payer (NHS) and the valuation of sales for the drug 
manufacturer for both scenarios. The results of this model showed that, depending on 
when a risk-sharing agreement is negotiated (i.e., before or after the price has been set for 
the drug), the agreement may increase or decrease the social welfare. Based on Barros 
(2011), Antonanzas et al. (2011) developed models to analyze scenarios with and without 
risk-sharing. Antonanzas et al. (2011) assumed that the price of the new drug is 
determined through a negotiation between the payer and the drug manufacturer. These 
authors explored how the optimal contract may depend on the trade-off among the 
monitoring costs, the marginal production cost, and the utility derived from treatment.  
1.2.2 Risk-sharing Based on Non-health Outcomes 
Zaric and O'Brien (2005) analyzed a drug manufacturer’s optimal statement of total 
budget for a new drug under a price-volume agreement. Under the price-volume 
agreement, if the total cost of a drug is greater than the projected budget, then the 
manufacturer must reimburse the healthcare payer a portion α, 0<α<1, of the difference 
between the true drug expenditures and the stated budget. The authors showed that the 
manufacturer’s optimal statement of total budget varies in unit price, unit cost, and the 
rebate proportion, which led the authors to argue that a single risk-sharing model would 
not be effective in all situations. 
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Zhang et al. (2011) developed a game theoretic model of price-volume agreement to 
investigate the optimal contract design in the presence of asymmetric information about 
the mean total demand. They considered a one-period problem in which the unit sales 
price and the rebate rate are offered by the payer to the manufacturer. The objective of 
the payer is to maximize its NMB, and the objective of the manufacturer is to maximize 
its profit. Among the findings in Zhang et al. (2011) are the following: an incentive-
compatible contract always exists; the optimal price is decreasing in expected market 
size; and the rebate may be increasing or decreasing in the expected market size. 
1.2.3 Uncertainty in Health Economic Evaluations 
There are two types of uncertainty in health economic evaluations: first-order uncertainty 
and second-order uncertainty (Briggs et al., 2012; Halpern et al., 2000; Stinnett and 
Paltiel, 1997). The effectiveness of a drug for the treatment of a disease may vary from 
one patient to another within the patient population. This heterogeneity in patient 
response to treatments could be observed in numerous settings. For example, there may 
be heterogeneity in delay until response and duration of response to a drug. First-order 
uncertainty reflects the heterogeneity inherent in the stochastic nature of the response to 
the drug (Halpern et al., 2000; Stinnett and Paltiel, 1997). Second-order uncertainty arises 
mainly owing to a lack of evidence about outcomes in a typical patient population or 
under “real-world” conditions, as opposed to the sample of patients in a clinical trial 
(Mullins et al., 2010; Halpern et al., 2000). For example, a clinical trial might not reflect 
reality when the sample of patients is not fully representative of the patient population or 
when imprecisions occur in measuring the trial outcomes. 
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First-order uncertainty, which is inherent in most risk-sharing papers by assuming that 
response of patients to the drug is stochastic in nature, is modeled by defining probability 
distributions for health and/or non-health outcomes of the drug. An examination of 
second-order uncertainty is not as common in risk-sharing papers. Some examples 
include Barros (2011) and Antonanzas et al. (2011), who incorporated second-order 
uncertainty by assuming that the probability of treatment success is uncertain. Zhang et 
al. (2011) also incorporated second-order uncertainty by assuming an error term for the 
drug demand. In my model, first-order uncertainty is expressed by treating the proportion 
of patients in each health state at each point of time as a random variable. I incorporate 
second-order uncertainty by assuming that the rates at which patients move from one 
health state to another are uncertain due to errors in measuring the response to the drug. 
1.2.4 Contributions of this Work 
This chapter investigates optimal decision-making by a drug manufacturer in a risk-
sharing agreement that is based on health outcomes of a new drug. Many of the other 
papers that investigated risk-sharing based on health outcomes used simple models of 
effectiveness, in which treatment is either a success or a failure (e.g., Barros (2011) and 
Lilico (2003)). In this chapter, I enrich modeling of patient response to the drug through a 
CTMC-based disease progression model. By using both analytical and numerical 
approaches, we gain insights into the performance of a risk-sharing agreement similar to 
the bortezomib agreement in the UK from the perspective of the drug manufacturer. Note 
that the mechanics of this type of risk-sharing agreement are different from those of the 
agreements discussed in the health-outcome–based papers of the literature review. This 
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difference makes a direct comparison of the results of this chapter with the results from 
those papers impossible. 
This chapter makes three main contributions. First, to my knowledge, this is the first 
study to capture both first- and second-order uncertainty in the context of a risk-sharing 
agreement with a drug manufacturer using a CTMC disease progression model. Second, 
this is the first study to investigate the dynamics of a risk-sharing agreement, in which the 
evaluation time for the patients’ response to the drug is one of the contract parameters. 
Third, this chapter specifies boundary conditions on the rebate rate, where the profit has 
an optimal solution or the profit becomes negative and thus the manufacturer has no 
incentive to participate.  
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Table ‎1-1: Table of decision variables and parameters 
ITEMS DESCRIPTIONS 
 Rebate rate (set by the healthcare payer) 
TE Evaluation time (to be negotiated by firm and healthcare payer) 
ΛS, ΛR Random variables for the transition rates. ΛS: from S, ΛR: from R to P; 
λS, λR realized values 
ΘS Given a transition from state S occurs, random variable for the 
probability that the destination is R; θS realized value 
S(t), R(t), P(t) Random variables for the proportions of patients in states S, R, and P, 
with uncertain parameters (first- and second-order uncertainty) 
S1(t), R1(t), 
P1(t) 
Random variables for the proportions of patients in states S, R, and P, 
for a given set of parameters (i.e., first-order uncertainty only) 
s, r, p Values taken by the random variables ( ), ( ),  and ( )S t R t P t respectively 
( ), ( )S t R t
 
Expected values of proportions of patients across states S and R at 
time t 
M,C Payment and marginal production cost for the drug per unit time 
πα(TE) Manufacturer’s profit for a given set of proportions of patients in 
states S, R, and P (first- and second-order uncertainty) 
Πα(TE) Expected value of the manufacturer’s profit with regard to first-order 
uncertainty for a given set of transition rates 
T
*
 Optimal evaluation time for Πα(TE) 
L  The lower threshold for α, for which ( ) / 0 at 0E E ET T T     
  The threshold for rebate rate, above which the profit becomes 
negative as TE approaches infinity. 
 
1.3 Model 
1.3.1 Disease Progression Model 
My model captures heterogeneity in patient response to a drug (i.e., first-order 
uncertainty) by modeling disease progression as a CTMC with three states: “Sick” (S), 
“Responding to the drug” (R), and “Progression of disease” (P), where P is an absorbing 
state that includes death (Figure 1-1). We let S(t), R(t), and P(t) denote the random 
variables for the proportions of patients at time t in state S, R, and P, respectively. We 
define ΛS as the (random) transition rate from state S and ΘS as the (random) probability 
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that the destination is R given that a transition from state S occurs. Thus, the probability 
that the destination is P, given that a transition from S occurs, is 1 .S   
Transition rates of patients from state S to state R and from state S to state P are therefore 
given by S S  and (1 ),S S   respectively. We let ΛR denote the (random) transition 
rate from state R to state P. My model also captures the imprecision in measuring patient 
response to the drug (second-order uncertainty) by assuming that CTMC transition rates 
are uncertain (i.e., ΛS, ΘS, and ΛR are random variables). 
Figure ‎1-1: Disease progression model 
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1.3.2 Manufacturer’s Profit 
I assume that the administration of a new drug is subject to a pay-for-performance risk-
sharing agreement between the drug manufacturer and a third-party payer. According to 
this agreement, patients start taking the drug at time t = 0 and stop receiving the drug as 
soon as the disease progresses (i.e., as soon as they enter state P, either from state S or 
state R). At a pre-specified time, TE >0, patients are evaluated to determine whether they 
are responding (and, hence, whether the drug has been successful). Patients who are not 
responding at TE stop receiving the drug. The manufacturer must rebate the payer a 
proportion α, 0≤α≤1, of the total sales incurred until time TE for two groups of patients: 1) 
patients who are not responding at TE (Figure  1-2A); and 2) patients for whom the disease 
has already progressed by TE (Figure  1-2B and 2C). Patients who are responding at TE 
continue taking the drug, and the manufacturer continues to collect sales revenues beyond 
time TE for as long as the patients continue to respond to the drug (Figure  1-2D).  
Figure ‎1-2: Timeline scenarios for sales of the drug for every patient 
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I ignore sunk costs of R&D and consider marginal production and distribution cost only. 
Let M be the payment for the drug per unit of time, and let C be the marginal production 
and distribution cost of the drug per unit of time. I assume the rebate parameter α is set by 
the payer and that TE is a parameter of the contract to be negotiated by the payer and 
manufacturer. Let πα(TE) be the manufacturer’s expected profit from sales of the drug 
with regard to both first- and second-order uncertainty:   
απ ( )  [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]. (1)
E E E E
E
T E Sales until T E Costs until T + E Future sales after T
                E Future costs after T  E Rebates
=
                               
In the Appendix, I describe how to calculate the five components of the expected value of 
the profit in (1) (See Equations [A1] to [A5]). These calculations involve multiple 
integrals over the state (S, R, P), time, and uncertain transition rates. Although there is no 
closed-form solution for the expected value, one way to estimate πα(TE) is through Monte 
Carlo simulation, which I show later in this chapter. By removing second-order 
uncertainty, we can simplify the problem and calculate the expected profit with regard to 
first-order uncertainty for a given set of transition rates. 
1.3.3 Model When CTMC Transition Rates are Known 
Let Πα(TE) be the expected profit with regard to first-order uncertainty for a given set of 
CTMC rates, λR, λS, and θS. For this given set of rates, let S1(t), R1(t), and P1(t) be the 
random variables for the proportions of patients in state S, R, and P at time t, respectively, 
and let s , r, and p denote the realized values at time t. The transition rate matrix of the 
CTMC model, G, is given for this set of parameters by: 
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(1 )
0 . (2)
0 0 0
S S S S S
R RG
      

   
 
 
                                                                                                   
I calculate the corresponding instantaneous transition probability matrix Q(t) of the 
CTMC as
1( ) exp( )tGQ t e B Dt B  , where D is the diagonal matrix of the eigenvalues 
associated with transition rate matrix G, and B is its corresponding matrix of eigenvectors 
(Grimmett and Stirzaker, 2007). This calculation yields:              
( ) 1 ( 1)  
( ) 0 1 , (3)
0 0 1
S S SR R
R R
t t tt t
t t
e A e e Ae A e
Q t e e
   
 
   
 
    

  
 
                                                          
where  A /S S R S     and λR ≠ λS. For λR = λS, ( )
S Rt tA e e
   and 
1 ( 1) SR
ttAe A e
     become indeterminate in Q(t), and instead, their limits as λR 
approaches λS (or vice versa) must be considered. For the remainder of this chapter, I 
ignore the special case of λR = λS. 
Let  1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )t S t R t P t  be the vector of expected values of the proportions of 
patients in states S, R, and P at time t for the given set of rates. I assume that
 (0) 1 0 0  , as all patients are initially sick and untreated. I use the formula 
( ) (0) ( )t Q t  (Grimmett and Stirzaker, 2007) to obtain the expected values of 
proportions across the CTMC states at time t: 
 ( )     ( )       1 ( 1) , (4)S S SR Rt t tt tt e A e e Ae A e                                                               
where λR ≠ λS.  
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Note that we could have used a system of linear differential equations to represent the 
disease progression model with constant flow rates between states. Solving this system of 
linear differential equation with the initial conditions of (0) 1,  (0) 0s r , and (0) 0p
by standard techniques (Boyce and Diprima, 2009) yields the means, as shown in 
Equation (4). However, a deterministic model would not allow us to model first-order 
uncertainty and estimates variability in the number of patients in states. 
In the Appendix, I show how to calculate the expected values of the five components of 
profit with regard to first-order uncertainty. Substituting Equations (A6) to (A10) for the 
expected values of the components of the profit given in (1) yields the expected profit 
with regard to first-order uncertainty for the given set of rates:
   1 1
1 1
( ) (1 ) 1 ( ) ( ), (5)SE E E E
S R R
T M C S T M T R T  
  
         
   
                                
where λR ≠ λS, and  ̅1(TE) and  ̅1(TE) are given by (4). 
Although perhaps not immediate from (5), it should be intuitive that the expected profit is 
decreasing in the rebate rate α (see Lemma A1 in Appendix). The component 11 ( )ES T  
in the first term of Equation (5) represents the expected value of the proportion of 
patients who are not in state S at the evaluation time TE. The coefficient  (1 )M C   
represents the net profit generated by a patient per unit of time. Thus, the coefficient 
 (1 ) SM C    in (5) represents the mean net profit generated by a patient during his 
or her stay in state S. If  (1 ) 0,M C   or alternatively, 1 ,C M    then the profit 
is increasing in 1/λS (mean duration in state S). The coefficient  (1 ) S RM C    in 
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(5) represents the mean net profit generated by a patient during his or her stay in state R. 
Similarly, if 1 ,C M    then the profit is increasing in θS (probability of response to 
the drug) and 1/λR (mean duration in state R). The component 1( )ER T in the second term 
of (5) represents the proportion of respondents at TE. The coefficient ( 1/ )E RM T  
consists of the two following portions of sales to a respondent at TE: 1) sales up to TE 
(i.e., MTE); and 2) sales for the mean duration in state R ( e., λ ).RMi. Thus, 
1( 1/ ) ( )E R EM T R T  in the second term of (5) corresponds to the sum of sales from all 
respondents at TE. The rebate rate α in the second term is to compensate for double-
counting the rebate corresponding to the respondents at TE in the first term of (5). See 
Equations (A6) to (A10) in the Appendix for further details. 
1.3.4 Optimal Profit   
In order to find the optimum evaluation time to maximize the drug manufacturer’s profit, 
we need to solve the following single-variable, non-linear optimization problem:   
 OP max ( )
s.t. 0
E
E
T
E
T
T


                                                                                                                                                                       
where Πα(TE) is the expected profit given in Equation (5). 
For the manufacturer, there are trade-offs in choosing TE under risk-sharing: if TE is too 
short, the drug manufacturer does not have time to generate much profit. On the other 
hand, if TE is too long, the manufacturer will have to pay a rebate to the payer for a high 
percentage of patients because all patients will eventually experience disease progression. 
Thus, the optimal value for the optimization problem (OP) is not obvious because the 
cost of evaluating too early should be balanced with the cost of evaluating too late. Let T
*
 
30 
 
be the optimal evaluation time for (OP), i.e., the maximizer of Πα(TE) given by Equation 
(5). Although there is no closed-form solution to (OP), it can be shown that under certain 
conditions the profit function Πα(TE) is concave (see subsequent section and Lemma A3 
in Appendix). It also follows from the implicit function theorem that T
*
 is decreasing in 
the marginal production cost C (see Lemma A4 in Appendix). Furthermore, it is possible 
to derive certain conditions regarding monotonicity of T
*
 as a function of the rebate rate α 
(see Lemma A5 in Appendix).                                                                                              
Moreover, when there is no risk-sharing agreement, α=0, and the rebate term in (5) is 
zero, we obtain the following expected profit:          
 0 1
1
( ) (1 ( )). (6)SE E
S R
T M C S T
 
    
  
                                                                                   
Since  ̅1(TE)>0 for all TE>0, it follows that Π0(TE)>0 as long as M>C. It is also apparent 
from (6) that since the asymptotic  ̅1(TE) is zero, the profit is maximized as TE 
approaches infinity if there is no risk-sharing agreement.  
1.3.5 Properties of the Optimal Profit 
In this section, I investigate the conditions under which the drug manufacturer’s expected 
profit is positive. The drug manufacturer incurs the highest rebate as TE approaches 
infinity. The asymptotic expected value of the profit in (5) is given by:  
 
1
lim ( ) (1 ) . (7)
E
S
E
T
S R
T M C 

 
     
  
                                                                                 
 
From (7) it is obvious that the asymptotic profit would still be positive in spite of 
incurring the maximum rebate if the rebate rate were low enough, i.e., 1 .C M  
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Thus, 1 C M    is a threshold for the rebate rate, above which the profit becomes 
negative as TE approaches infinity. It follows that if M>C, then α∞ is always larger than 
zero and less than one, i.e., α∞       . Even when α>α∞, the profit can still be positive 
for some TE<∞, namely if the number of patients responding to the drug at TE is high 
enough and fewer rebates are therefore required.  
Let αL denote a threshold for the rebate rate, such that, for α= αL, the slope of the 
expected profit function (5) is zero at TE=0, i.e., 
0
( ) / =0.
E
E E T
T T   This yields:        
1 (1 ). (8)S SL
R
C
M

 
   
 
                                                                                                            
When the rebate rate α<αL, then the slope of the profit function is positive at TE=0, which 
implies that the manufacturer’s profit is positive for some TE>0. From (8), we see that the 
threshold αL is decreasing in the marginal production cost C and increasing in the quality 
characteristics of the drug (i.e., the response rate λSθS and the mean duration of response 
1/λR). Note that αL does not necessarily have to be less than one. That is, even if α>1, as 
long as α<αL , the manufacturer can still make a positive profit and rebate more than 
sales of the drug collected from non-responding patients. From (8) it follows that if 
( ) ,R S S M C M      then αL>1. For instance, if M>2C and ,S S R     then αL>1. 
Since / 0,S S R    it follows from (8) that α∞<αL. Thus, a rebate rate α>αL implies that 
the profit of the manufacturer starts with a negative value and also ends asymptotically 
with a negative value as TE approaches infinity. However, when α>αL, it is still possible 
that the manufacturer’s profit will be positive for some TE>0 owing to the unimodal 
shape of  ̅1(TE). 
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Let Rt  be the time, at which the number of patients in state R is maximized, i.e., 
1( ) / 0.
Rt t
R t t

    For ,R S   this leads to     ln( ) ln /R R S R St        (see 
Lemma A2 in Appendix). It can be shown that Πα(TE) is concave for α≤αL and tR≤TE≤2tR 
(see Lemma A3 in Appendix).  Next, I describe the conditions for the existence of T
*
, i.e., 
the optimal evaluation time for Πα(TE) given by Equation (5), as a function of α, M, C, 
and the transition-rate parameters.                                                                     
Proposition 1:        
(a) If ,L   then there is an optimal evaluation time T
*
>tR, such that Πα(T
*
)>0 
 
is 
the global maximum. 
(b) If ,L      then there is a finite optimal evaluation time T
*
, tR< T
*
<∞, 
such that Πα(T
*
)>0
 
is the global maximum. 
Since α∞<αL, a rebate rate α≤αL falls into one of the following categories: α<α∞, α=α∞, or 
α∞<α≤αL. The interpretation for α<α∞ is that the net sales are greater than the rebate paid 
for a non-respondent patient per unit of time (i.e.,  ).M C M   It follows from part 
(a) of Proposition 1 that for α<α∞, there is a T
*
>tR such that Πα(T
*
)>0
 
is the global 
maximum. 
The condition α=α∞ can be interpreted as the manufacturer being at the breakeven point 
for a non-respondent patient per unit of time (i.e., ).M C M   It follows from part (b) 
of Proposition 1 that for α=α∞, there is always a finite T
*
, such that tR<T
*
<∞. 
The interpretation for α>α∞ is that the net profit for a non-respondent patient in one unit 
of time is negative. In other words, the manufacturer is making a loss here by paying a 
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rebate (αM) that is larger than the profit ( )M C  per non-respondent patient. However, 
according to part (b) of Proposition 1, despite this loss situation, the manufacturer can 
still make a positive profit overall. This result arises owing to the fact that as long as  
≤αL, the slope of ( )ET remains non-negative at TE=0. 
The condition α∞<α≤ αL can also be rearranged and written as in the following ordering 
between the transition rates:  0 ( ) / ( ) .R S S M C M M C         This gives the 
range of λR for which there is a finite T
*
>tR under certain values for M, C, α, λS, and θS. 
For instance, if 2M C M   and ,S S R     then there is a finite T
*
>tR such that 
Πα(T
*
)>0
 
is the global maximum.  
The condition for a finite T
*
 when α≥α∞ can be explained as follows:
  
As TE approaches 
infinity, all patients become non-respondents and the manufacturer is overall at the 
breakeven point when α=α∞ or overall making a loss when α>α∞. This implies that for 
α≥α∞, T
*
 needs to be finite in order to yield a positive optimal profit. The result T
*
>tR in 
Proposition 1 can be interpreted as follows: The manufacturer prefers to wait at least until 
the number of responding patients is maximized. 
In the numerical examples section that follows, I further explore the properties of the 
expected profit by running simulation and estimating the distribution of the profit at each 
evaluation time TE. 
1.4 Monte Carlo Simulation of Manufacturer’s Profit 
In order to simulate the manufacturer’s profit with regard to both first- and second-order 
uncertainty, we need to estimate the parameters for the general model. In the following 
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section, I apply the approach of  Welton and Ades (2005) to estimate the distributions for 
the transition rates ΛR, and ΛS and the probability of success ΘS, using published data 
from a phase 2 clinical trial (Richardson et al., 2003).  
1.4.1 Estimation of Transition Rate Distributions    
Let Se  and Re  be the total patient-months of exposure observed in states S and R during 
the course of the trial, respectively. The exposure for a patient in a state, e.g., S or R, is 
the time the patient spends in that state during the course of the trial. The total exposure
,ie  , ,i S R is the sum of individual exposures for patients in state i and is equivalent to 
the area under the curve that plots the number of patients in the respective state at each 
point of time.  
Let nS and nR be the total number of transitions during the course of the trial out of states 
S and R, respectively. According to the conjugacy property, I assume that the (random) 
rates ΛS and ΛR are gamma distributed with prior parameters of aS and bS, and aR  and bR, 
respectively (Gelman et al., 2004). Let nS,R be the number of transitions from state S to 
state R during the course of the trial. Following Welton and Ades (2005), I assume that 
the distribution of ΘS is beta with prior parameters a and b (again owing to the 
conjugacy property). I derive the following posterior distributions from their respective 
prior distributions by using the approach of Welton and Ades (2005):                                                                                   
 ( , ), (9)R R R R RGamma a n b e                                                                                                   
( , ), (10)S S S S SGamma a n b e                                                                                                     
, ,( , ). (11)S S R S S RBeta a n b n n                                                                                                                                           
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I use the above formulas for the distributions of the CTMC parameters to illustrate with a 
number of examples the optimal evaluation time for a drug manufacturer who has entered 
a risk-sharing agreement similar to the bortezomib agreement in the UK for the treatment 
of multiple myeloma. I fit the disease progression model using data from a phase 2 
clinical trial (Richardson et al., 2003), and calculate the profit function for the 
manufacturer under a number of different conditions.  
1.4.2 Numerical Examples for Distributions 
In Richardson et al. (2003), the Kaplan-Meier method was used to perform time-to-event 
analysis of the trial outcomes. The time to first response was defined as “the time from 
the initial administration of bortezomib to the first evidence of a confirmed response.” 
The duration of a response was defined as “the time from the achievement of a response 
to progression.” The time to disease progression was defined as “the time from the initial 
administration of bortezomib to disease progression.”  
In the trial, 202 patients enrolled between February and December 2001. Of these, 193 
patients could be evaluated. Patients received eight cycles of treatment (i.e., 24 weeks or 
about six months) during the course of the trial. There were 67 patients (35%) with a 
complete, partial, or minimal response to the drug. Among the 67 respondents, the 
median time to first response was 1.3 months. The median time to progression of disease 
among all 202 patients was seven months. The median time to progression among 
patients with a complete or partial response to bortezomib alone was 13 months. The 
median duration of the response among the 67 patients with a complete, partial, or 
minimal response to bortezomib alone was 12 months.  
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I estimate the parameters λS, λR, and θS by using the data from the above-described 
clinical trial. I use the Kaplan-Meier plot of time to progression of disease in the 193 
patients treated with bortezomib (plot A in Richardson et al. (2003)), and estimate the 
number of patients for whom the disease has not progressed yet for a number of points in 
time (i.e., number of patients in R+S). I also use the Kaplan-Meier plot of the duration of 
the response in the 67 respondents (plot B in Richardson et al. (2003)) and extract the 
cumulative number of patients for whom the disease has progressed after responding to 
the drug for a number of points in time (i.e., cumulative number of transitions from state 
R to state P).  
According to the results of the trial, of 67 respondents, 50% responded by 1.3 months 
after the initial administration of bortezomib (i.e., about 34 patients). From Richardson et 
al. (2003), the response times are unclear for the remaining 33 respondents after 1.3 
months from the start of the trial. I produced an initial estimate of cumulative number of 
transitions from S to R from month two onward using a weighted least-squares approach. 
According to the result of this estimate, it took all 67 respondents eight months from the 
beginning of the trial to respond to the drug. I then estimated the number of patients in 
state R and, consequently, the number of patients in state S, at a respective number of 
points in time.  
I use Equations (10) and (11) to estimate the distributions for ΛS and ΘS. The figures for 
the number of patients in state S at the end of the trial suggest that 168Sn   and 
1095.98.Se   Also, the cumulative number of respondents (i.e., cumulative transitions 
from state R to state P) suggests that 
, 67.S Rn   I use Equation (9) to estimate the 
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distribution of ΛR. The cumulative numbers of patients with progression of disease out of 
the 67 respondents suggest that 48Rn   and 434Re  . In the absence of any prior data 
for the parameters of the distribution of ΛS, ΘS, and ΛR,  I assume that 0.1,S Sa b 
1,a b   , , 1,S R S Pd d   and 0.1R Ra b  (Welton and Ades, 2005). Thus, we obtain 
the following distributions:                                                                                      
(168.1,1096.1), (12)S Gamma                                                                                                       
~ (68,102), (13)S Beta                                                                                                                    
~ (48.1,434.1). (14)R Gamma                                                                                         
From distributions in (12) to (14), we obtain the following expected values and standard 
deviations for ΛS, ΛR, and ΘS: λ 0.15,S  θ 0.4S  , λ 0.11,R   and λσ 0.012,S 
θσ 0.038,S  λσ 0.016.R   Figure 1-3 shows the actual numbers of patients without 
progression (i.e., patients who are in S+R), as well as the average numbers of those 
patients resulted by simulation at certain points of time. Figure 1-3 also shows the 95% 
confidence interval (CI) for the numbers of patients without progression. In the following 
section, I use the above-estimated distributions for the CTMC transition rates to estimate 
the distributions of the profit function for a number of numerical examples.  
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Figure ‎1-3: Simulated versus actual number of patients in state R+S at time t 
 
 
1.4.3 Simulation of the Drug Manufacturer’s Profit 
I scale the price of the drug to one (M=1) and interpret the cost C as a proportion of M. I 
investigate profit for several combinations of  and C. For the base case, I assume that 
C=0.3M. Assuming a high production cost for the drug is because the production of new 
expensive drugs such as biologics is very costly and the populations of patients targeted 
for treatment by these specialized drugs are usually small. The time spent in state S and 
the time spent in state R follow exponential distributions with parameters ΛS and ΛR 
given by (12) and (14), respectively; the probability of response to the drug follows the 
binomial distribution ΘS, given by (13).  
I incorporate first-order uncertainty (i.e., stochastic nature of response of patients to the 
drug) by assuming that the duration of stay in sate S and the response time are distributed 
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according to exponential distributions with parameters S  and ,R  respectively.  Then I 
assume that the probability of response for each patient who leaves state S is also 
stochastic and distributed according to a Bernoulli distribution.  I use the following steps 
to simulate the manufacturer’s profit with regard to both first- and second-order 
uncertainty. First, I generate a set of CTMC transition rates from the distributions given 
by (12) to (14). Then, I use those values and simulate 1,000 times the response of a 
patient to the drug and calculate accordingly the manufacturer’s profit. I repeat the above 
procedure 1,000 times. Figure 1-4 shows the expected values of the profit resulting from 
simulation, i.e., πα(TE), for α=70% and α=100% (dashed lines).  
Figure ‎1-4: Simulated versus derived expected values of profit Equation‎(5),‎πα(TE) 
versus‎Πα(TE) 
 
Figure 1-4 also shows the calculated expected values of the profit with respect to only 
first-order uncertainty, i.e., Πα(TE) based on λS=0.15, θS=0.4, and λR=0.11 (solid lines). It 
can be seen in Figure 1-4 that for various rebate rates, the expected values of the profit 
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including the optimal values estimated by πα(TE) are very close to the respective values 
calculated by Πα(TE). Therefore, the calculated expected value with the known CTMC 
parameters (as given in equation (5)) yields a good approximation to the model when 
there is no closed form solution for the expected value of the profit that results from 
incorporating both first and second-order uncertainty (i.e., πα(TE)).  
For the base case numerical illustration, α∞=70%.  I incorporate the expected values of 
the transition rates in Equation (8) to calculate the rebate rate lower threshold αL≈109%. 
Figure 1-4 also shows the expected values of the profit for α= α∞, α= αL, and for α= 
120%. 
Figure 1-5 shows the mean and 95% CI of the profit under the no-risk-sharing scenario 
(α=0) and under the risk-sharing scenario with α=100%. Figure 1-6 shows the mean and 
95% CI of the manufacturer’s loss at each evaluation time TE when the profit under the 
risk-sharing scenario with α=100% is compared with the profit under the no-risk-sharing 
scenario, i.e., when the profit of the manufacture is calculated for α=0. In Figures 1-5 and 
1-6, the expected values are obtained with regard to both first- and second-order 
uncertainty, whereas the 95% CI values are obtained with regard to second-order 
uncertainty only. Figure 1-6 shows that the loss is increasing in TE for the parameters 
used in this example. According to Corollary 1 in the Appendix, the loss is increasing in 
TE if 1 10.11 ( ) (0.06 1/ ) ( ).E E ER T T S T   
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Figure ‎1-5: Mean and 95% CI for the profit with no risk-sharing (α=0) and with 
risk-sharing‎(α=100%) 
 
Figure ‎1-6: Mean‎and‎95%‎CI‎for‎the‎manufacturer’s‎loss‎due‎to‎risk-sharing with 
α=100%‎in‎comparison‎with no risk-sharing‎(α=0) 
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1.4.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
In the following section I investigate how T
*
 and the respective optimal profit Πα(T
*
) vary 
with the model parameters. As depicted in panel (a) of Figure 1-7, T
*
 is decreasing in the 
rebate rate α for the following reasons. A shorter evaluation time implies smaller sales of 
the drug because patients use the drug for a shorter period of time. Since the rebate is a 
proportion of the total sales, smaller sales implies a smaller rebate. Thus when α is large, 
a large rebate can be offset by smaller sales resulting from a shorter evaluation time.  
Panel (b) of Figure 1-7 shows that Πα(T
*) is also decreasing in α since for a larger α, the 
rebate is higher and thus the profit is smaller. It can be seen from panel (b) that for 
α≥120%, Πα(T
*
)=0 at T
*=0, i.e., no feasible agreement is possible in this range of α. It 
can be verified that the results shown in Figure 1-7 (a) with respect to T
*
 for various 
rebate rates are consistent with the conditions stated in Proposition 1. The results shown 
in Figure 1-7 (a) are also consistent with Lemma 3, i.e., T
*
 is decreasing in rebate rate α 
as long as  * * *1 10.11 ( ) 0.06 1/ ( ).R T T S T   
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Figure ‎1-7: Sensitivity‎analysis‎with‎regard‎to‎the‎rebate‎rate‎α‎(C=0.3M,‎λS=0.15, 
θS=0.4,‎and‎λR=0.11) 
     (a) Sensitivity analysis of T*                                (b) Sensitivity analysis of Πα(T
*
) 
      
  
 
 
 
In panel (a) and (b) of Figure  1-8 we see T
*
 and Πα(T
*
) are both decreasing in C for 
reasons similar to those above regarding the rebate rate α. Panel (b) shows that for 
C>0.41, Πα(T
*
)=0 at T
*
=0, i.e., no feasible agreement is possible in this range of C.                                
Figure ‎1-8: Sensitivity analysis with regard to the marginal cost C (=100%, 
λS=0.15,‎θS=0.4,‎and‎λR=0.11) 
       (a) Sensitivity analysis of T*                              (b) Sensitivity analysis of Πα(T
*
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel (a) of Figure  1-8 shows the following results: T
*≈11 months for C=0.1M, T*≈10 
months for C=0.2M, T
*≈9 months for C=0.3M, and T*≈7 months for C=0.4M. It can be 
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seen from the NICE guidelines for bortezomib that α=100% and the evaluation time is 
after four cycles of treatment with bortezomib (NICE, 2007). Four cycles is equivalent to 
12 weeks, i.e., TE≈3 months (Richardson et al., 2003). For all above-mentioned cases, 
except for the last case (i.e., C=0.4M), the drug manufacturer still makes profit with TE=3 
months. However, for example, for C=0.1M, the profit of manufacturer at the optimal 
evaluation time is more than two times higher than the profit after four cycles of 
treatment (i.e., 2.35 versus 1.11).  
Figures 1-9 to 1-11 show the sensitivity analysis with regard to the CTMC rates (λR, θS, 
and λS, respectively). 
Figure ‎1-9: Sensitivity‎analysis‎with‎regard‎to‎the‎transition‎rate‎λR (α=100%,‎
C=0.3M, λS=0.15,‎and‎θS=0.4) 
       (a) Sensitivity analysis of T*                          (b) Sensitivity analysis of Πα(T
*
) 
 
In panel (a) and (b) of Figure  1-9 we see both T
*
 and the optimal profit Πα(T
*
) are 
decreasing in λR. This is because a larger λR implies a shorter mean duration in state R per 
respondent (1/ λR). A shorter mean duration in state R implies that the manufacturer 
prefers a shorter evaluation time such that more respondents can be measured at that 
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time. A shorter mean duration in R also implies a smaller profit such that for 1/ λR≤5.3 
(i.e., λR≥0.19), Πα(T
*
)=0 at T
*
=0, i.e., no feasible agreement is possible in this range of 
λR.  
In panel (a) and (b) of Figure  1-10 we see both T
*
 and the optimal profit Πα(T
*
) are 
increasing in θS. This is because a larger θS implies a higher proportion of respondents. 
Figure  1-10 shows that for θS≤0.25, Πα(T
*
)=0 at T
*
=0, i.e., no feasible agreement is 
possible in this range of θS.  
Figure ‎1-10: Sensitivity analysis with regard‎to‎the‎probability‎of‎response‎θS 
(α=100%,‎C=0.3M, λS=0.15,‎and‎λR=0.11) 
       (a) Sensitivity analysis of T*                          (b) Sensitivity analysis of Πα(T
*
) 
 
Finally in panel (a) of Figure 1-11, T
* is flat for small λS, increasing for intermediate λS, 
and decreasing for large λS. This relationship between T
*
 and λS can be explained as 
follows. If duration in state S is long (λS small), the manufacturer benefits by a long 
evaluation time so more patients move from S to R. However, if duration in state S is 
short (λS large), a long TE can harm the manufacturer because a high proportion of 
patients have exited R.  
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In panel (b) of Figure  1-11, the optimal profit Πα(T
*) is increasing in λS. This is because a 
shorter mean duration in state S (i.e., a larger λS) implies a higher number of respondents 
at the respective optimal evaluation time T
*
.  As shown in Figure  1-11, for λS≤0.09, 
Πα(T
*
)=0 at T
*
=0, i.e., no feasible agreement is possible in this range of λS. 
 
Figure ‎1-11: Sensitivity‎analysis‎with‎regard‎to‎the‎transition‎rate‎λS (α=100%,‎
C=0.3M, θS=0.4,‎and‎λR=0.11) 
       (a) Sensitivity analysis of T*                          (b) Sensitivity analysis of Πα(T
*
) 
 
1.5 Conclusions and Future Research 
I investigated the optimal evaluation time for a drug manufacturer under a pay-for-
performance contract similar to the risk-sharing agreement used for bortezomib in the 
UK. The parameters used in this risk-sharing agreement can be categorized into two 
groups. The first group consists of the rebate rate α, the unit price of the drug M, and the 
evaluation time TE. The parameters in this group are used to define the terms and 
conditions in the contract. The second group consists of the drug response rate λSθS, the 
disease progression rate λR, and the drug production and distribution cost C. The 
parameters in this group are related to the characteristics of the drug and are generally 
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private information of the drug manufacturer. My analysis in this chapter reveals how 
different settings among the parameters of these two groups affect the profit and the 
optimal solution for the drug manufacturer.  
My study highlights the trade-offs in negotiating this type of agreement. The analytical 
results supported by numerical examples in this study showed that, in many instances, the 
profit is non-monotonic for this type of risk-sharing agreement. Proposition 1 establishes 
boundary conditions on the rebate rate α, such that the status of the manufacturer’s profit 
falls into one of the following two categories: 1) There is an optimal solution for the 
profit.  2) The manufacturer makes no profit and therefore would not participate. The 
following general rules can be derived with regard to the above mentioned categories: If 
λSθS is larger than λR and the rebate paid per patient (αM) is less than double the profit 
margin (2 ( )),M C  then there is an optimal solution for the drug manufacturer. On the 
other hand, if λSθS is smaller than λR and the rebate paid exceeds double the profit margin, 
then the drug manufacturer will make a loss. However, based on my numerical analysis 
(using data from the clinical trial of bortezomib), we observe that for low production cost 
C, the manufacturer makes a profit under most circumstances. 
There are many promising directions for extending the model and for future research. The 
NICE assessment found that the incremental cost per quality-adjusted life year gained 
among patients with minimal response (i.e., a reduction of 25%-49% in serum M protein) 
would be very high (NICE, 2007). Thus, a potential extension to the model would be to 
assume a lower rebate rate for patients with minimal response compared with the rebate 
rate for non-respondents (i.e., patients with a reduction of less than 25% in serum M 
protein) and investigate the optimal solution under the new contract structure. I assumed 
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that the effectiveness of the drug was the only source of uncertainty. However, the cost of 
a new drug could be a source of uncertainty that could be incorporated in the model by 
assigning a probability distribution for that cost. The demand for the new drug can be 
incorporated in the model by assuming that the cohort size of patients administered the 
drug is a function of the price of the drug, the rebate rate, or both.  
A limitation of this research is that it does not present the perspective of a second party, 
e.g., a healthcare payer, along with the drug manufacturer’s perspective. Therefore, a 
potential area of future research would be to take a game theoretic approach in which a 
payer (e.g., NHS or a public drug plan) and a drug manufacturer are taking part. The first 
step to establishing this game is to find a suitable objective function for the payer. One 
possibility for the payer’s objective function is to calculate the NMB of the payer by 
incorporating commonly accepted willingness-to-pay thresholds. The next step would be 
to specify the structure of the game and determine its respective incentive compatibility 
constraints. For instance it is possible to take a sequential approach such that for every 
rebate rate set by the payer, first the drug manufacturer determines the optimal price for 
the drug to maximize its profit. Then, the payer chooses the optimal evaluation time in 
order to maximize its NMB. 
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Appendix to Chapter 1 
Calculation of the Expected Profit 
In the following I show how to calculate the expected profit with regard to both first- and 
second-order uncertainty. Let R(t) and S(t) be the random variables for the proportions of 
patients in state S and R at time t, respectively, and let s and r denote the realized values. 
Let also ΛS, ΛR, and ΘS be the random variables for the CTMC rates, and λS, λR, and θS be 
the realized values. Patients who are in state S (i.e., those who are taking the drug but 
have not yet responded to it) as well as patients who are in state R (i.e., those who are 
responding to the drug) contribute to the sales (and costs) of the drug until the evaluation 
time TE. This leads to the following expressions for the terms in πα(TE):
   
  
0
1 1 1
( ), ( ), , ,
0 0 0 0 0 0
  ( ) ( )
= ( , ,λ ,λ ,θ ) , (A1)
E
E
S R S
T
E
t
T
S t R t S R S S R S
t
E Sales until T E M S t R t dt
M s r dt f s r dsdrd d d  

 
  

  
  


     
 
where ( ), ( ), , , (.)S R SS t R tf     is the joint probability density function of R(t), S(t), ΛS, ΛR, and 
ΘS (t is a deterministic variable between 0 and ).ET  
Similarly, I calculate the expected costs until ET :
   
  
0
1 1 1
( ), ( ), , ,
0 0 0 0 0 0
  ( ) ( )
= ( , ,λ ,λ ,θ ) . (A2)
E
E
S R S
T
E
t
T
S t R t S R S S R S
t
E Costs until T E C S t R t dt
C s r dt f s r dsdrd d d  

 
  

  
  


     
 
Only those patients who are responding at t=TE will contribute to future sales and costs of 
the manufacturer beyond TE. These patients continue taking the drug until disease 
progresses. The proportion of patients who are responding at TE is a random variable 
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denoted by R(TE). We can calculate the future costs and sales, as in the following: 
    
 1 ( ) ( ) ( ), ( ), , ,0 0 0 0 0 0
    = ( ) ( ) ( )         
                                           = ( ) = 
= ( , ,λ ,λ
E
E
E E E
S R S
E E E
t T
t T
r T s T T
S t R t S R
t
E Future sales after T E E M R t R T S T dt
E M R t dt
M r dt f s r




 
  

  
    
 
  
 


      ,θ ) .  (A3)S S R Sdsdrd d d  
 
Similarly, 
 
 1 ( ) ( ) ( ), ( ), , ,0 0 0 0 0 0
 cos    =
= ( , ,λ ,λ ,θ ) . (A4)
E E E
S R S
E
r T s T T
S t R t S R S S R S
t
E Future ts after T
C r dt f s r dsdrd d d  
 
  

      
 
If the manufacturer were to rebate to the payer a proportion  of total sales until the 
evaluation time TE, then the total rebate would be calculated as  
0
( ) ( ) .
ET
t
M S t R t dt


However, in accordance with pay-for-performance, no rebate will be paid for those 
patients who are responding to the drug at time ET . If the responders at ET were supposed 
to be rebated, then their respective rebate amount would be equal to ( )E EMT R T . This 
amount should be deducted from the total rebate in order to calculate the net expected 
rebate to be paid to the payer:
   
  
0
1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0
( ), ( ), , ,
 ( ) ( ) ( )
= ( )
                                        ( , ,λ ,λ ,θ ) . (A5)
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E
S R S
T
E E
t
T
E E
t
S t R t S R S S R S
E Rebates E M S t R t dt MT R T
M s r dt MT r T dt
f s r dsdrd d d
 
 
  

 

  
   
  
 


       
Calculation of the Expected Profit for a Given Set of Transition Rates 
I calculate the expected profit with regard to first-order uncertainty for a given set of 
CTMC rates, λR, λS, and θS. For this set of given rates, let R1(t) and S1(t) be the random 
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variables for the proportions of patients in state S and R at time t, respectively, and let s 
and r denote the realized values. Using similar arguments for the calculation of the profit 
in the above section leads us to the following expressions for the expected values of the 
terms in Πα(TE):
   
   1 11 1
1 1
0
1 1 1
( ) ( )( ) ( )0 0 0 0 0
  ( ) ( )
= ( ) ( ) ( ) ,
E
E E
T
E
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T s T
S t S tR t S ts t s r t
E Sales until T E M S t R t dt
M s f s dt ds M r f r s dt f s drds


    
  
  
    

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where 
( ) ( )S tf s is the probability density function of S1(t) and 
1 1( ) ( )
( )
R t S t
f r s is the 
conditional density function of R1(t) given S1(t)=s.  
Interchanging the order of integration, we obtain:
   
 
 
1 1 1 1
1 1 1
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1 1
0
1 1
  ( ) ( ) ( )
                            ( ) ( )  
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                              1- ( ) (
E
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    
 
 
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   

). (A6)
 
Similarly, we calculate the expected costs until ET :
   1 1
1
  1- ( ) ( ). (A7)SE E E
S R R
C
E Costs until T C S T R T
 
  
   
 
Only those patients who are responding at t=TE will contribute to future sales and costs of 
the manufacturer beyond TE. These patients continue taking the drug until disease 
progresses. The proportion of patients who are responding at TE is a random variable 
denoted by R1(TE) with mean  1( ) .S E R ET TER T A e e     
I define a new CTMC model 
with only two states, i.e., R and P, to capture future sales. In this new CTMC model, 
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those patients who were responding to the drug at time TE —i.e., R1(TE) —begin in state 
R at t=TE, and then move to state P with transition rate λR. We obtain the transition rate 
matrix G and the corresponding instantaneous transition probability matrix Q(t) of the 
two-state CTMC disease progression model as in the following: ,
0 0
R R
G
  
  
 
and  
( ) ( )1
( )
0 1
R E R Et T t Te e
Q t
    
  
 
   for t≥TE. 
Let  1 1( ) ( ) ( )t R t P t   be the vector of expected values of proportions of patients across 
states R and P at time t≥TE in the two-state CTMC model. Considering the initial 
condition of  1(0) ( ) 0ER T  , we use the formula ( ) (0) ( )t Q t  to obtain 
( )
1 1( ) ( )   .
R Et T
E ER t R T e t T
   
 
Having found R1(t) for t≥TE with the assumed boundary 
conditions, we can calculate the future costs and sales, as in the following: 
   1 1
( )
1 1
    = ( ) ( )         
                                           = ( ) = ( )
                                   
E
R E
E E
E E
t T
t T
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If the manufacturer were to rebate to the payer a proportion  of total sales until the 
evaluation time TE, then the total rebate would be calculated as  1 1
0
( ) ( ) .
t
M S t R t dt



However, in accordance with pay-for-performance, no rebate will be paid for those 
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patients who are responding to the drug at time ET . If the responders at ET were supposed 
to be rebated, then their respective rebate amount would be equal to 1( )E EMT R T . This 
amount should be deducted from the total rebate in order to calculate the net expected 
rebate to be paid to the payer:
   
 
1 1 1
0
1 1
 ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
                            1 ( ) ( ) . (A10)
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Lemma A1 
Expected profit in Equation (5) is decreasing in the rebate rate α. 
Proof of Lemma A1 
1 1
To prove mathematically that the expected profit in (5) is decreasing in ,  it is enough
to show that the rebate paid,  i.e.,  (A10),  is increasing in . From (A10) we have :
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1 1 1
0
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Lemma A2 
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Proof of Lemma A2 
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Lemma A3 
Let Πα(TE) be given by Equation (5). For α≤αL, Πα(TE) is concave if tR≤TE≤2tR .  
Proof of Lemma A3 
1
To investigate the conditions under which ( ) is concave, we need 
to calculate the first and second derivatives of  ( ) with regard to :
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Lemma A4 
Let T
*>0 denote the optimal evaluation time for (OP) given exogenous rebate rate α and 
marginal production cost C, such that
*( ) / 0,
E
E E T T
T T    and
*
2 2( ) / 0.
E
E E T T
T T 
     Then T* is decreasing in C. 
Proof of Lemma A4 
 According to the implicit function theorem, we have: 
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* *
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2
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2 2 2 *
1
* * *
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( ) /
( ) / 0 and ( ) / (1 ) ( ) 0
for all 0.      0  for all 0   is decreasing in .
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           


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Lemma A5: 
Let T
*
>0 denote the optimal evaluation time for (OP) given an exogenous rebate rate α, 
such that
*( ) / 0,
E
E E T T
T T    and *
2 2( ) / 0.
E
E E T T
T T 
     
(a) For λR large enough such that  * * *1 1( ) 1/ ( ),R S SR T T S T      T
*
 is decreasing 
in rebate rate α.  
(b) For  * * *1 1( ) 1/ ( ),R S SR T T S T      T
*
 is increasing in rebate rate α.  
Proof of Lemma A5 
* *
*
*
2
2 2
* 2 2
2
According to the implicit function theorem, we have:
( ) /
( ) /
Since  is the optimal point,  ( ) / 0. On the other hand, 
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  
  
*
*
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* * *
1 1 1
2 * * * *
1 1
2 * * * *
1 1
2 *
1
Replacing ( ) with ( ) ( ) yields:
( ) / 1 ( ) ( )
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 
 
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1
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1 1
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1 1
( ).   Thus,
0,  i.e.,  is decreasing in   if  ( ) 1 / ( ).
Similarly,  is increasing in   if  ( ) 1 / ( ).
Q.E.D.
E
E
E R S S
T T
E R S S
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




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Corollary 1 
The manufacturer’s loss in a risk-sharing agreement with rebate rate α=100% is 
increasing in TE if  1 1( ) 1/ ( ).R E S S E ER T T S T      
Proof of Corollary 1 
 
 
1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1
1 1
1 ( ) ( ) .
1 1
/ ( ) ( ) ( )
Replacing ( ) with ( ) ( ) yields:
/ 1 (
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   
                
    
      
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Proof of Part (a) of Proposition 1 
   1 1
1
1
0
1 1
( ) (1 ) 1 ( ) ( ),
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or less than ,  the slope 
of ( ) remains non-negative.
From P1-1 and P1-2: For ,  (0, ] such that ( ) is the global maximum.
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0 (See Lemma A3 for the second derivative of ( )),
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Proof of Part (b) of Proposition 1 
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Chapter 2  
2 Payer and Manufacturer Perspectives on a 
Pharmaceutical Health-based Pay-for-performance 
Risk-sharing Agreement  
Development of new pharmaceutical drugs has become increasingly costly, and the 
incremental benefit or effectiveness is often small and uncertain. One mechanism to 
offset some of the uncertainties surrounding new and costly drugs is health-based pay-
for-performance risk-sharing agreements. In this chapter I extend on the first chapter to 
examine the performance of a risk-sharing contract between a payer and a pharmaceutical 
firm from the payer’s perspective. The basis of the contract is that the pharmaceutical 
firm rebates a portion of the sales from patients who do not respond to the drug. The 
objective of this chapter is to identify the conditions under which the rebate rate and 
evaluation time are mutually beneficial, i.e. where both the payer and the pharmaceutical 
firm have incentives to introduce the new drug. I investigate how different classifications 
of rebates for non-respondent patients affect the two parties. The analysis of the contract 
performance is based on an underlying patient-level disease progression model. Based on 
published data from a phase 2 clinical trial of an oncology drug, I empirically estimate 
disease progression parameters and conduct numerical analyses of the risk-sharing 
agreement. My results indicate that 1) there are trade-offs in choosing the evaluation time 
for both parties, such that its optimal value is not easily identifiable; 2) the payer is better 
off under one specific type of risk-sharing agreement in most practical circumstances; 
and 3) the evaluation times beneficial to both parties are sensitive to the proportion of the 
rebate that the payer has missed to invoice and collect.  
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2.1 Introduction 
There are several types of risk-sharing agreements used in practice. Each type of risk-
sharing agreement has its unique mechanics including the set of contract parameters, 
which generate the specific dynamics for that agreement. Zaric et al. (2013) provide a 
literature review on risk-sharing agreement modeling. They present several examples of 
different types of risk-sharing schemes illustrating the broad scope of these types of 
contracts.  
A prominent example of a pay-for-performance risk-sharing agreement is the agreement 
between the UK’s National Health Service (NHS) and the drug manufacturer of 
bortezomib in 2007.  In the first chapter, I examined the performance of a risk-sharing 
agreement similar to the bortezomib agreement in the UK from the perspective of the 
drug manufacturer in which a rebate rate 0    and an evaluation time 0ET   were the 
contract parameters. Patients were evaluated at some evaluation time to determine 
whether they are responding to the new drug. I analyzed a rebate classification in which 
the drug manufacturer rebates to the payer a proportion α of the sales from all patients up 
to ET excluding the sales from those who are responding to the drug at .ET  
I refer to the above described rebate classification as RSA1 throughout this chapter.  I add 
the suffix 1 to RSA1 to differentiate this rebate classification from two other 
classifications that can be derived based on the same contract parameters. Brief 
descriptions of these two rebate classifications and the motivations for their derivations 
are as follows. The fact that only responding patients at the evaluation time are not 
subject to rebate implies that the manufacturer has to pay rebate for responding patients 
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for whom disease progressed before the evaluation time under RSA1. Some may find this 
classification unfair and argue that any responding patient up to the evaluation time 
should be excluded from rebate. Considering this argument, I present another rebate 
classification denoted by RSA2 in which the drug manufacturer rebates to the payer a 
proportion of the sales from patients who have not responded to the drug prior to and at 
the evaluation time. A more general case for RSA2 would be to assume that a minimum 
response time is required from any responding patient in order not to be subject to rebate. 
However in this chapter I assume that such a minimum response time is not required. On 
the other hand, the payer may decide to ask the manufacturer to pay the rebate only for 
patients who are not responding to the drug at the evaluation time (e.g., due to the 
simplicity of its implementation), which constitutes the third rebate classification RSA3 
to be discussed in this chapter. Therefore under RSA3, only patients who are neither 
responding nor for whom disease has progressed at the evaluation time will be subject to 
rebate. 
In this chapter I extend on the first chapter to examine the performance of RSA1 from the 
payer’s perspective. I further develop the disease progression model by incorporating a 
fourth health state and use a system of linear differential equations to describe transitions 
between these health states. The solution to this system of differential equations yields 
the proportions of patients in each health state at each point in time. I use these 
proportions to calculate the payer’s net monetary benefit (NMB). In calculating the 
payer’s NMB, I incorporate two administrative costs: 1) the administrative cost for 
monitoring of patients; and 2) the administrative cost for invoicing and collecting the 
68 
 
rebate associated with every non-responding patient. In the rest of this chapter, I refer to 
this cost as the administrative cost of collecting the rebate. 
The objective of this chapter is to identify sets of contract parameters (the rebate rate and 
evaluation time) that are mutually beneficial, i.e. where both the payer and the 
pharmaceutical firm have incentives to introduce the new drug. I develop the base model 
by using RSA1 and extend it further to RSA2 and RSA3. I investigate how different 
rebate classifications affect the two parties. In particular I examine if there is one specific 
rebate classification under which the payer is better off in most practical circumstances.  
The description of the notations used in this chapter is as follows. Lowercase letters are 
used to denote the per unit values of measurable parameters. For instance, “w” is used to 
denote the willingness to pay (WTP) per unit of effectiveness and " "Dc  is used to denote 
the cost of the drug per unit of time. Uppercase letters are used to denote the total values 
of the measureable parameters, e.g., " "DC is used to denote the total cost of the drug.  
Lowercase Greek letters are used to denote the rebate rate as well as the transition rates 
used in the disease progression model. 
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Table ‎2-1: Table of model parameters 
ITEMS DESCRIPTIONS 
, TE Rebate rate and evaluation time 
S,R,P, and 
D 
Disease progression model states: “Sick” (S), “Responding to drug” (R), 
“Progression of disease” (P), and “Death” (D) 
, ,S R P    Transition rates from states S, R, and P respectively 
S  Proportion of patients transitioning from state S to state R 
ˆ
S  
Transition rates from state S to state P after evaluation time TE 
S(t), R(t), 
P(t), D(t)          
 
Proportions of patients in S, R, P, and D respectively for t>0 
HN, HO Total effectiveness of the new and existing treatments  
CN, CO  
 Total cost of the new and existing treatments 
,D DC c  Total and per unit of time price of the new drug 
,M MC c  Total and per unit of time production cost of the new drug 
,B AC C  Total cost of care for the new treatment before and after TE 
, ,S R Pq q q  Weights of quality of life in health states S, R, and P 
ˆ
Sq  
Weight of quality of life in health state S after TE 
,V VC c   
Total and per unit of time administrative cost of monitoring 
,I IC c   
Total and per non-responding patient administrative cost of collecting 
rebate 
, ,S R Pc c c  
Unit cost of care in health states S, R, and P respectively 
ˆ
Sc  
Unit cost of care in health state S after TE 
w Willingness to pay for one unit of effectiveness 
B, π 
 
Payer’s net monetary benefit and drug manufacturer’s profit 
 
2.2 The Model 
2.2.1 Disease Progression Model 
To describe patient response to the new drug, I extend the disease progression model 
developed in the first chapter by adding a new state “Death”, which results in a disease 
progression model with the following four health states: “Sick” (S), “Responding to the 
new drug” (R), “Progression of disease” (P), and “Death” (D) (Figure 2-1). Adding the 
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fourth state “Death” enables us to calculate the NMB of patients for whom the disease 
has progressed (i.e., patients in state P). 
All patients begin in state S at time t=0 and start taking the drug. Patients who respond to 
the drug make a transition from S to R. Patients who do not respond to the drug and 
whose health status does not worsen remain in S. Patients who do not respond to the drug, 
and whose health status worsens make a transition from S to P. The disease will 
eventually progress for responding patients, implying that those patients make a transition 
from R to P. I assume that patients stop receiving the drug as soon as the disease 
progresses (i.e., as soon as they enter state P, from either state S or R). We also assume 
that all patients experience disease progression before entering the “Death” state.  
Figure ‎2-1: Disease progression model 
 
Let S  be the transition rate from S and let S  be the proportion of patients who move 
from S to R. Thus, the transition rates from S to R and from S to P are S S   and 
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).S S    Let R  be the transition rate from R to P and P  be the transition rate from P 
to D. Let S(t), R(t), P(t), and D(t) be the proportions of patients in states S, R, P, and D at 
time t, respectively. Figure 2-1 shows the disease progression model and its respective 
system of linear differential equations.  I use the following system of linear differential 
equations to represent the disease progression model of Figure 2-1:  
( )
 ( ),
( )
S
S t
S t
t

 

 
( )
  ( ) ( ),S S R
R t
S t R t
t

    

 
 
( )
 1 ( ) ( ) ( ),S S R P
P t
S t R t P t
t

       

 
( )
 ( ). P
D t
P t
t

 

 
Since all patients start in state S, we have the following initial conditions: S(0)=1 and 
R(0)=P(0)=D(0)=0. We solve this system of linear differential equations using standard 
techniques (Boyce and Diprima, 2009) and obtain the following solutions: 
( ) ,                                                                                                    (1) S
t
S t e
                                                                                                                                            
( ) ( ) ),                                                           (2)S R
t t
S S R SR t e e
                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
1 2 2 1( ) ( ) ,                                                   (3)
S R Pt t tP t K e K e K K e
                                                                                              
where ,Et T  1 ( ) ( )( ) ,S R S S S P S R SK                and 
 2 ( )( ) .R S S P R R SK           The proportion of patients in state D is calculated by: 
( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ).D t S t R t P t     
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2.2.2 Disease Progression Model after Evaluation Time   
Patients are evaluated at some evaluation time 0ET   to determine whether they are 
responding to the new drug (and hence whether the new treatment has been successful). 
Patients who are not responding at ET  and are still in S stop receiving the drug. These 
patients may switch back to the old treatment or be administered an alternative treatment 
while they continue to receive necessary care. In the context of this chapter we assume 
that  after the evaluation time ,ET the proportion of transitions from S to R will become 
zero, i.e., 0,S  and the new transition rate from S to P will be ˆ S  (Figure 2-2).  
Figure ‎2-2: Disease progression model for t>TE 
 
Patients who are responding at ,ET i.e., those who are in R, continue to take the drug as 
long as they respond to the drug. Thus, the transition rates R  and P will remain the 
same after .ET  We solve the new system of differential equations for Et T  with S(TE), 
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R(TE), and P(TE) as its initial conditions calculated by substituting ET  for t in equations 
(1) to (3) respectively and obtain the following result:   
ˆ ( )
( ) ( ) ,                                                                                  (4)S E
t T
ES t S T e
                                                                                                                             
( )( ) ( ) ,                                                                                  (5)R Et TER t R T e
                                                                                                                           
 
ˆ ( ) ( )
3 4
( )
3 4
( ) ( ) ( )
            ( ) ( ) ( ) ,                                      (6)
S E R E
P E
t T t T
E E
t T
E E E
P t K S T e K R T e
P T K S T K R T e
   
 
 
  
 
where ,Et T 3
ˆ ˆ( ),S P SK      4 ( ),R P RK    and S(TE), R(TE) and P(TE) are 
obtained by substituting TE for t in equation (1) to (3), respectively. Similarly, the 
proportion of patients in state D is calculated by: ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ).D t S t R t P t     
2.2.3 Calculation of Payer’s Net Monetary Benefit 
According to the economic evaluation method used in this chapter, a new drug is deemed 
cost-effective if its NMB is positive (NMB>0). Let B(TE,α)  be the NMB of the payer 
resulting from the administration of the new treatment to a cohort of patients. We use the 
following formula to calculate the NMB (Drummond et al., 2005): 
( , ) ( ) ( ), (7)E N O N OB T w H H C C                                                     
where NH and NC  are the total effectiveness and the total cost of the new treatment, OH
and OC  are the total effectiveness and the total cost of the existing treatment, and w is the 
payer’s WTP per unit of benefit (which we operationalize as quality-adjusted life years 
[QALYs] gained). Thus, NH in (7) will consist of the effectiveness of the new treatment 
before and after ,ET  denoted by BH and AH  (i.e., NH  BH + ).AH   
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The total cost of new treatment NC  in (7) consists of the following cost components: BC
and AC  for the cost of care for the new treatment before and after ,ET DC  for the total 
cost of the drug for the new treatment, VC for the administrative cost of monitoring of 
patients, and jIC  for the administrative cost of collecting the rebate for non-respondent 
patients, where j=1, 2, and 3 j( NC  BC + AC + DC + VC + j).IC  Cost of care refers to the cost 
of care services needed to manage illness throughout the treatment. Some examples of 
care services are pain management and management of the adverse effects of drugs. The 
subscript j=1, 2, and 3 in jIC  refers to RSA1-3 since, as it will be shown, this cost is a 
function of the rebate classification used in the agreement. Let jR  be the rebate to be 
paid to the payer under risk-sharing, where j=1, 2, and 3 refers to the rebate 
classifications RSA1-3.  
We incorporate the above described cost and effectiveness components in (7) and obtain 
the following equation for the payer’s NMB under risk-sharing:  
j j
j
( , ) ( ) ( )
                 ,                                                                    (8)
E B A B A D V I
O O
B T w H H C C C C C
R w H C
        
   
      
where j=1, 2, and 3 refers to RSA1-3. Next we calculate the components of equation (8). 
In calculating these components, S(t), R(t), and P(t) are given by equations (1) to (3) for 
Et T and by equations (4) to (6) for ,Et T  respectively.  
Let 0 1iq   be the quality of life (QoL) weight of the drug effectiveness in state i=S, R, 
and P, and ˆ0 1Sq   be the respective QoL weight in S after .ET I have assumed a 
75 
 
different QoL weight in S after the evaluation time because non-responding patients stop 
receiving the drug after that time. The quality-adjusted effectiveness of the new treatment 
until ET  and after ET  are given by: 
 
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ,                                           (9)
ET
B S R P
t
H q S t q R t q P t dt

       
 ˆ ( ) ( ) ( ) .                                         (10)
E
A S R P
t T
H q S t q R t q P t dt


       
To calculate the cost of care for the new treatment before and after ,ET i.e., BC and ,AC
we replace ,Sq ˆ ,Sq ,Rq and Pq with the respective costs of care per unit of time, i.e., ,Sc
ˆ ,Sc  ,Rc  and ,Pc  in BH and ,AH  respectively. For the same reason presented above for 
QoL weight, I have assumed a different unit cost of care in S after the evaluation time. 
Thus: 
 
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ,                                             (11)
ET
B S R P
t
C c S t c R t c P t dt

       
 ˆ ( ) ( ) ( ) .                                           (12)
E
A S R P
t T
C c S t c R t c P t dt


       
Let Dc  be the payment for the new drug per unit of time. The total payment for the new 
drug by the payer to the drug manufacturer DC  is calculated using the following equation:  
  0 ( ) ( ) ( ) .                                           (13)
E
E
T
D D
t t T
C c S t R t dt R t dt

 
      
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In this chapter, I incorporate two types of administrative costs including the cost for 
monitoring of patients and the cost for collecting and invoicing the rebate. I assume that 
both administrative costs are incurred by the payer. Next I describe these costs in more 
detail and show how to calculate them. 
Administrative Cost for Monitoring of Patients 
Patients need to be monitored on a regular basis (e.g. monthly) to keep track of the 
number of cycles of the drug and to ensure that they stop taking the drug as soon as the 
disease progresses. Monitoring of patients is also needed in order to ensure that no rebate 
for non-responding patients will be missed to be invoiced and collected. Let Vc be the 
administrative cost of monitoring each patient per unit of time. The total monitoring cost 
VC  is given by:  
  0 ( ) ( ) ( ) .                                           (14)
E
E
T
V V
t t T
C c S t R t dt R t dt

 
      
Administrative Cost for Collecting the Rebate 
According to a report on the uptake of the patient access scheme for bortezomib in the 
UK, the bortezomib risk-sharing scheme was considered as being a “time consuming 
process” and “very labour intensive” ((Williamson, 2009), page 28).  Considering the 
above statement, I assume that the payer incurs an administrative cost for collecting the 
rebate associated with a non-responding patient denoted by .Ic  Table 2-2 shows the 
health state transition scenarios for a patient until ,ET  their respective rebate or no rebate 
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status at ,ET and the respective proportion of patients resulting after each health state 
transition up to .ET  As can be seen from Table 2-2, the total administrative cost of 
collecting the rebate is a function of the respective rebate classification. Thus, we let jIC  
denote the total one-time cost of collecting the rebate, where j=1, 2, and 3 refers to 
RSA1-3.  
Table  2-2: Health state transition scenarios until ET  under RSA1, RSA2, and RSA3 
Heath State Transition RSA1 RSA2 RSA3 Proportions up to TE 
Respond and remain in R  No Rebate No Rebate No Rebate ( )ER T  
Respond and progress Rebate No Rebate No Rebate (1 ( )) ( )S E ES T R T    
Direct progress from S Rebate Rebate No Rebate )(1 ( ))S ES T    
Remain in S Rebate Rebate Rebate ( )ES T  
 
We substitute equations (9) to (14) for HB, HA, CB, CA, CD, and CV, respectively, in (8) 
and obtain the following equation for NMB:  
 
 
j
0
j j
( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )
ˆ                 ( ) ( ) ( )
                 ,                                                           (15)
E
E
T
E S R P
t
S R P
t T
I O O
B T k S t k R t k P t dt
k S t k R t k P t dt
C R w H C




     
     
    

  
where j=1, 2, and 3 refers to RSA1-3, S(t), R(t), and P(t) are given by equations (1) to (3) 
for ,Et T and by equations (4) to (6) for ,Et T  respectively,  and 
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( ),S S D S Vk w q c c c     ˆ ˆ ˆ ,S S Sk w q c   ( ),R R D R Vk w q c c c      and
.P P Pk w q c     
By assuming that patients are monitored even without any risk-sharing scheme in place 
(i.e., 0Vc  for α=0), the coefficients in (15) can have the following interpretations: Sk
and ˆ
Sk  are the monetary benefit minus the cost per patient in health state S per unit of 
time before and after the evaluation time ,ET  respectively. Similarly, Rk  and Pk  are the 
monetary benefit minus cost per unit of time per patient in health state R and P, 
respectively.  
We substitute equations (1) to (3) and (4) to (6) for to the proportions of patients in state 
S, R, and P before and after TE in (15) to obtain the following equation for the NMB of 
the payer: 
 
j
j j
ˆ
( , ) ( )
ˆ
                 .                                                           (16)
S S R S S R S P
E E
S R S R PS
I O O
k k k k k k
B T S T
C R w H C

  
              
    
 
The coefficients /S Sk   and ˆ ˆ/S Sk   in (16) represent the mean monetary benefit minus 
the mean cost per patient in state S under no risk-sharing before and after the evaluation 
time ,ET  respectively. Since ( ) 1ES T   for all ,ET a positive Sk in (16) indicates that the 
payer’s NMB is increasing in 1 S (mean time spent in state S). Similarly, the 
coefficients /R S Rk   and /P Pk  in (16) represent the mean monetary benefit minus the 
mean cost generated by a patient in state R and P, respectively. Also, a positive Rk  in (16) 
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indicates that the payer’s NMB is increasing in S  (proportion of patients responding to 
the drug) and 1 R (mean response time). 
Estimating Parameters of the Existing Treatment HO and CO   
The components Ow H  and OC  in (16) represent the estimated means of the monetary 
health benefit and cost of the existing treatment, respectively. To estimate these 
components as functions of the other model parameters, I envision a hypothetical case 
where patients are administered the new drugs at 0ET   and evaluated at the same time. 
This implies that for 0,ET   nobody is using the new drug effectively and, therefore, the 
NMB of the payer resulting from the new treatment under this hypothetical situation is 
null. Thus, by incorporating 0ET   in equation (16) we obtain the following result (note 
that j 0R   and j 0IC   at 0ET   since the administration of the new treatment has not 
started yet):   
j
ˆ
( 0, )
ˆ
 0.                                                      (17)
S P
E O O
PS
k k
B T w H C
  
It follows from (17) that O Ow H C  is equal to 
ˆ ˆ/ / .S S P Pk k   The component 
ˆ ˆ/ /S S P Pk k   in (17) can be interpreted as the NMB that would result from the new 
treatment (i.e., monetary benefit minus cost of the new treatment) if patients were 
evaluated at 0.ET   Under this condition, the benefit of the payer would consist of the 
QALYs gained in states S and P, where the QoL weight in state S is ˆSq  and the transition 
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rate to state P is ˆ .S  Similarly, the cost of the payer would consist of the costs of care in 
states P and S, where the unit cost of care in state S is ˆ .Sc  
Substituting ˆ ˆ( / / )S S P Pk k   for O OW H C  in (16) yields the following 
equation for the payer’s NMB: 
 j j j( , ) 1 ( ) ,                                                             (18)E B E IB T k S T R C                                                                        
where j=1, 2, and 3 refers RSA1-3 and ˆ ˆ/ / / .B S S R S R S Sk k k k     In equation 
(18) the component 1 ( )ES T  represents the proportion of patients who are not in state S 
at time TE and the coefficient Bk represents the mean NMB resulting from a patient as 
long as that patient is taking the drug. 
2.2.4 Payer’s Net Monetary Benefit Under RSA1 
It follows from equation (18) that for calculating the NMB of the payer under RSA1, 
1( , ),EB T  we need to calculate 1IC  and 1.R Table 2-2 shows that under RSA1, the 
proportion of patients who are subject to rebate is equal to 1 ( ).ER T Thus, we obtain the 
following equation for the administrative cost of collecting the rebate for 0 :ET   
  1 1 .                                     (19)I I EC c R T    
Note that 1 0IC   at  0ET   since the treatment with the new drug has not started yet. 
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Calculation of Rebate Under RSA1 
According to the technology appraisal guidance for the use of bortezomib in the UK 
patients are evaluated after four cycles of treatment. The treatment needs to be 
discontinued and rebated in patients who had responded less than partially and should 
continue in those who had responded at least partially (NICE, 2007). RSA1 is based on 
the following interpretation from the above guidance: The drug manufacturer rebates to 
the payer a proportion α of the sales from all patients up to the evaluation time ET  (i.e., 
after four cycles) excluding the sales from those who are responding to the drug at .ET  
The rebate under RSA1 (i.e., 1)R  can be calculated from the information shown in 
Table 2-2 (i.e., health state transition scenarios for a patient until ET  and their respective 
rebate or no rebate status at ET  under RSA1). I use equation (A10) from the first chapter 
to calculate the rebate under RSA1 as given below: 
 1
1 1
1 ( ) ( ) .                        (20)SD E E E
S R R
R c S T T R T 
   
             
 
2.2.5 Manufacturer’s Profit Under RSA1 
Let Mc be the marginal production and distribution cost of the drug for the manufacturer 
per unit of time. From the first chapter, the manufacturer’s profit under RSA1 denoted by 
1( , )ET  is given by the following equation: 
     1 1( , ) 1 1 .                                     (21)E D M S S R ET c c S T R                     
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2.3 Payer’s Decision Under RSA1 
The payer solves the following single-variable, non-linear constrained optimization 
problem to maximize its NMB:  
1(OP1) :   ( , )
E
E
T
max B T   
1s.t.:    ( , ) 0,ET    
         0,ET   
where 1( , )EB T  is given by equation (18) for j=1, and 1,IC 1,R  and 1( , )ET   are given 
by equations (19) - (21), respectively. 
For both the payer and the manufacturer, there are trade-offs in choosing ET  under 
RSA1: if ET  is too short, the payer does not have time to generate much benefit, nor the 
manufacturer to generate much sales revenue. On the other hand, if ET  is too long, the 
manufacturer will have to pay a rebate to the payer for a high percentage of patients 
because all patients will eventually experience disease progression after responding to the 
drug (i.e., few patients remain in state R). Thus, for the base case RSA1, a too long ET  
could be beneficial to the payer, but not to the manufacturer. This implies that the optimal 
value of ET  for the optimization problem of (OP1) is not obvious, and in finding the 
optimal ,ET  the cost of evaluating too early should be balanced with the cost of 
evaluating too late. There is no closed-form solution for the optimization problem of 
(OP1). I investigate the properties of (OP1) in the next section. 
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2.3.1 Properties of Net Monetary Benefit and Profit Functions 
under RSA1 
When ET  approaches infinity, all patients are entitled to receive a rebate and, thus, the 
payer collects the largest rebate. From equation (18), the asymptotic NMB of the payer is 
given by: 
1
1
lim ( , ) . (22)
E
S
E B I D
T
S R
B T k c c 

 
      
  
                                 
In equation (22) the first term represents the loss incurred (i.e., 0)B Ik c  and the 
second term represents the rebate collected at infinity. It follows from (22) that
1lim ( , ) 0
E
E
T
B T

  for ,
p   where   
(p S R I B
D R S S
c k
c

   

    
 (See the derivation in the 
Appendix). Thus, p
  is a threshold for the rebate rate, above which the NMB>0 (i.e., 
the rebate would exceed the loss incurred) as TE approaches infinity. For ,
p   the 
payer’s NMB can still be negative for some 0<TE<∞, namely if the number of non-
responding patients at TE is not high enough to compensate for the respective loss 
through the collected rebate at TE.  
Similarly, in the first chapter I defined 
m  as a threshold for the rebate rate, above which 
the profit becomes negative as TE approaches infinity, i.e., 1lim ( , ) 0
E
E
T
T 

 for ,
m 
where 1 .
m M
D
c
c
    
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Next, I describe the conditions under which the rebate rate and evaluation time are 
mutually beneficial, i.e. where both the payer and the drug manufacture have incentives 
to introduce the new drug. 
Proposition 1: Let 1
m M
D
c
c
   and 
 
( )
.p I B S R
D R S S
c k
c

  

    
  If ,
p m       then there 
are feasible solutions for the optimization problem (OP1).  
Note that 
p m    is satisfied when .
I B R S S
D M S R
c k
c c
    

  
 This is equivalent to 
( ) R S SI B D M
S R
c k c c
   
  
 
 as .D Mc c The right-hand side of this inequality 
represents the mean net profit from the sales of the drug in state  S and R, i.e., 
 D M Sc c  and   ,D M S Rc c   respectively. Therefore, 
p m    when the mean net 
profit of the manufacturer becomes greater than a certain value resulting from the payer’s 
cost and monetary benefit parameters, i.e., .I Bc k   
Proposition 1 guaranty the existence of feasible solutions for both the payer and the 
manufacturer when  .
p m      However, the existence of feasible solutions under 
other scenarios for α, such as ,
p  ,
m   or ,
m p      need to be examined 
separately. In the next section the existence of feasible solutions for both players are 
investigated in a number of examples. 
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2.4 Examples 
I calculate the payer’s NMB and the drug manufacturer’s profit under RSA1 for a 
numerical example. I use the following values for the transition rates estimated in the first 
chapter by using data from a phase 2 clinical trial for bortezomib (Richardson et al., 
2003): 0.15,S  0.11,R  and 0.4.S   I also assume ˆ =0.3S and 0.8.P   
I assume that the treatment cycle of bortezomib is 3 weeks (Richardson et al., 2003) and 
its average cost per treatment cycle is ₤3,000 (NICE, 2011). Thus, we obtain the 
following monthly payment for the drug: Dc  ₤4,000. The NHS WTP threshold for an 
intervention is between ₤20,000 and ₤30,000 per QALY (NICE, 2010; McCabe et al., 
2008). Thus, considering the upper limit of ₤30,000 per QALY in our examples, we 
obtain w=₤2,500 as the WTP per one quality-adjusted life month. The values for other 
parameters used in this example, including the unit administrative costs, the unit costs of 
care, as well as the weights of QoL in different health states, are given in Table 2-3.  
Table ‎2-3: Baseline values and costs used in the model 
Parameter Amount Reference 
,  ,  S R S    0.15, 0.11, 0.4 Chapter 1 
ˆ ,  S P   
0.3, 0.8 Assumed 
w ₤2,500 (NICE, 2010; McCabe et al., 2008) 
Dc
 
₤4,000 (NICE, 2011; Richardson et al., 2003) 
,  V Ic c  ₤100, ₤1,000 Assumed 
,  S Rc c  ₤400 Assumed 
ˆ,  P Sc c  ₤2,000 Assumed 
,  S Rq q  0.58, 0.68 (NICE, 2011) 
ˆ,  P Sq q  0.1, 0.5 Assumed 
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In panel (a) and (b) of Figure 2-3, the solid lines and the dashed lines show the NMB of 
the payer and the profit of the manufacturer, respectively. The solid circles in panels (a) 
and (b) show that the NMB of the payer is equal to zero right at the start of the treatment 
(i.e., at 0).ET   Panel (a) in Figure 2-3 shows that under no risk-sharing, i.e., α=0, no 
agreement is possible between both parties because the payer’s NMB is always negative. 
For 0.2 ,M Dc c we obtain the following thresholds for the rebate rate: 0.7
p  and 
0.8.m   Thus, according to Proposition 1, for ,  0.7 0.8,  there are feasible 
solutions for both the payer and the drug manufacturer. For example, for 0.79,  the 
NMB of the payer and the profit of the manufacturer are both positive when 35ET 
months. However, such large evaluation times might not be practical when the life 
expectancy is small (e.g., less than 24 months). Under this circumstance, it needs to be 
examined whether there are feasible solutions with shorter evaluation time for the rebate 
rates outside of the above mentioned range (e.g., for 0.8).   
Panel (b) of Figure 2-3 shows that for α=100% and 0.2 ,M Dc c  a feasible agreement is 
possible for 17 25ET  months (because NMB and π are both positive), whereas for 
0.35 ,M Dc c  no agreement is possible. On the other hand, Figure 2-4 shows that for 
α=120% and 0.2 ,M Dc c  a feasible agreement is possible for 6 16ET   months (i.e., as 
α increases the agreement becomes feasible for shorter evaluation times).  
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Figure ‎2-3: Payer’s‎NMB‎(solid‎line)‎and‎manufacturer’s‎profit‎(dashed‎line)‎under‎
RSA1                                                                                                                                 
             (a): α=0 and 0.2M Dc c                              (b): α=100%, 0.2M Dc c and 0.35 Dc  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎2-4: Payer’s‎NMB‎(solid‎line)‎and‎manufacturer’s‎profit‎(dashed‎line)‎under‎
RSA1 for α=120% and 0.2M Dc c  
 
A report on the uptake of patient access schemes in the NHS notes that a major rebate 
was lost because the respective departments had missed multiple claims for bortezomib. 
The same report concludes that the NHS could lose significant revenue if the risk-sharing 
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scheme is not managed effectively and claims are missed ((Williamson, 2009), page 28). 
In order to account for the missed rebate, we assume that ω, 0≤ ω ≤ 1, is the proportion of 
the rebate collected (i.e., the collected rebate is equal to )R  while the administrative 
cost of collecting the rebate is incurred for the whole .R  Figure 2-5 shows that for 
α=100%, 0.2 ,M Dc c  and 95%,  a feasible agreement is possible for 21 29ET   
months (i.e., as the proportion of the collected rebate decreases the agreement becomes 
feasible for larger ).ET  
Figure ‎2-5: Payer’s‎NMB‎(solid‎line)‎and‎manufacturer’s‎profit‎(dashed‎line)‎under‎
RSA1 for α=100%, 0.2 ,M Dc c  and‎ω=95% 
 
2.5 Other Rebate Classifications 
In this section I describe the rebate classifications RSA2 and RSA3 in more detail and 
derive the equations for the calculation of rebate and administrative cost of collecting the 
rebate under those classifications. Then, I compare all three different rebate 
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classifications and show that as the rebate increases so does the administrative cost of 
collecting the rebate. Therefore, it is not obvious under which rebate classification the 
payer generates the highest NMB. 
Rebate Under RSA2 and RSA3 
The second rebate classification (RSA2) is derived from a slight modification in the 
interpretation for the base case RSA1. According to this modified interpretation, the drug 
manufacturer rebates to the payer a proportion α of the sales from patients who have not 
responded to the drug prior to and at TE. The difference between RSA1 and RSA2 is with 
respect to patients who responded to the drug but whose disease progressed prior to TE 
(and they switched to a different drug). Under RSA1, the sales from this group are 
subject to rebate, while they are not subject to rebate under RSA2 (Table 2-2). From 
Table 2-2 the health state transition scenarios that are subject to rebate under RSA2 are: 
“Direct progress from S” and “Remain in S” by .ET  By calculating the total time spent 
by patients in these health state transition scenarios, we obtain the following equation for 
the calculation of rebate under RSA2: 
       
    
2
0
0
1 ( ) +
       1 ( ) + ,                                        (23)
E
E
T
D S E E E E
T
D S E S E
R c S t dt T S T T S T
c S t dt T S T
 

   
   


      
where      01 ( )
ET
S E ES t dt T S T    is the total time spent in state S by non-
respondents who progressed by ET  and  E ET S T  is the total time spent in state S by non-
respondents at .ET  Substituting (1) for S(t) yields: 
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 
    2
1
1 .                                                (24)
S
D E E S E
S
R c S T T S T 
 
    
 
 
I derive the third rebate classification (RSA3) from the report into the uptake of the 
patient access scheme for bortezomib in the NHS, which implies that the rebate is 
potentially missed to be invoiced for patients who do not get as far as 4 cycles of 
treatment ((Williamson, 2009), page 17). This statement implies that those patients, for 
whom the disease progresses before the evaluation time (i.e., 4 cycles), are not rebated. 
According to this interpretation, the drug manufacturer rebates to the payer a proportion α 
of the sales from patients who are not responding to the drug at TE (i.e., only patients who 
are neither responding nor for whom disease has progressed at the evaluation time will be 
subject to rebate).The difference between RSA2 and RSA3 is with respect to non-
responding patients whose disease progressed prior to TE. Under RSA2, the sales from 
this group are subject to rebate, while the manufacturer does not need to pay rebate for 
this group under RSA3 (Table 2-2).  
The proportion of patients who are not responding to the drug at time TE is equal to S(TE). 
Therefore, we calculate the rebate under RSA3 according to the following equation: 
3 ( ).                                                                          (25)D E ER c T S T     
It is intuitive from Table 2-2 and the descriptions of rebates under the base case RSA1 
and two other classifications that 1 2 3R R R     for all .ET  The formal mathematical 
proof is also given in Lemma A1 in the Appendix. 
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Administrative Costs of Collecting Rebates Under RSA2 and RSA3 
With reference to Table 2-2, we obtain the administrative costs of collecting the rebate 
under RSA2 and RSA3 by the following equations for 0 :ET   
   
 
2
3
1 1 , (26)
. (27)
I I S E
I I E
C c S T
C c S T
   
 
 
Note that 2IC  and 3 0IC  at 0ET   since the treatment with the new drug has not started 
yet. It is intuitive from Table 2-2 that 1 2 3I I IC C C    for all .ET The formal 
mathematical proof is also given in Lemma A2 in the Appendix. 
To calculate the NMB of the payer under RSA2 and RSA3 we use equation (18) in which 
for j=2, 2R  and 2IC are given by equations (24) and (26) for RSA2, and for j=3, 3R  and 
3IC are given by equations (25) and (27) for RSA3. To calculate the manufacturer’s profit 
under RSA2 and RSA3, I generalize on equation (21) by replacing 1R  with j :R  
 j j
1
( , ) ( ) 1 ( ) ,                                       (28)SE D M E
S R
T c c S T R 
 
    
  
 
where j=2, 3 is the subscript referring to RSA2 and RSA3, and Rα2 and Rα3 are given by 
(24) and (25), respectively.  
As it was shown for RSA1, the following single-variable, non-linear constrained 
optimization problem needs to be solved in order to find the optimal evaluation time for 
the payer to maximize its NMB under RSA2 and RSA3: 
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j
j
(OPj) :   ( , )
                     ( , ) 0
                     0,
E
E
T
E
E
max B T
T
T

  

 
where for j=2, 3, Bj(TE,α)  is given by (18), and πj(TE,α) is given by (28). 
Similar to RSA1, there are trade-offs in choosing TE for both the payer and the 
manufacturer under RSA2 and RSA3. However, contrary to RSA1, a too long ET  could 
be beneficial only to the manufacturer (and not to the payer) under both RSA2 and RSA3. 
This is because all patients will eventually experience disease progression either directly 
or after responding to the drug (i.e., few patients remain in state S). Thus, if ET  is too 
long, the payer will claim a rebate for a lower percentage of patients under RSA2 and 
RSA3. This also implies that the optimal values of ET  for the optimization problems of 
(OP2) and (OP3) are not obvious, and in finding the optimal ,ET  the cost of evaluating 
too early should be balanced with the cost of evaluating too late. 
As in the case of (OP1), there are not any closed-form solutions for the optimization 
problems of (OP2) and (OP3) either. Since 1 2 3R R R     and at the same time
1 2 3,I I IC C C   it is not obvious which rebate classification generates the largest NMB 
for a given ET  (i.e., it is not obvious if 1 2 3).B B B   Figure 2-6 shows the NMB of the 
payer under RSA1 (solid line), RSA2 (dashed line), and RSA3 (dotted-dashed line) for 
α=100% (the rest of the model parameters used in these figures are taken from Table 2-
3). This example illustrates a case in which the price of the drug is high while the rebate 
rate is not large enough. Under this circumstance, as shown in Figure 2-6, RSA1 would 
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be the only rebate classification that could compensate for the loss and generate some 
positive NMB. This is achieved by demanding the manufacturer pay the rebate for those 
responding patients who are not responding at ET  (see panel [b] of Figure 2-3 for the 
conditions on ET  for a feasible agreement under RSA1 when 0.2 ).M Dc c    
Figure ‎2-6: Payer’s‎NMB‎under‎RSA1‎(solid‎line),‎RSA2‎(dashed‎line),‎and‎RSA3‎
(dotted-dashed line) for α=100% and Dc  ₤4,000; solid circle shows NMB at 0ET   
 
Figure 2-7 shows the NMB of the payer under RSA1-3 when the price of the drug is 
halved compared to example 2-6, i.e., Dc  ₤2,000 per unit month. As a result of reducing 
the price of the drug, the NMB of the payer has become positive under RSA2 and RSA3 
for certain ranges of .ET   
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Figure ‎2-7: Payer’s‎NMB‎under‎RSA1‎(solid‎line),‎RSA2‎(dashed‎line),‎and‎RSA3‎
(dotted-dashed line) for α=100% and Dc  ₤2,000; solid circle shows NMB at 0ET   
 
On the other hand, Figure 2-8 illustrates the case where the rebate rate is increased to 
150% while the price of the drug is high (i.e., Dc  ₤4,000 per unit month). Under this 
circumstance, as depicted in Panel (a) of Figure 2-8, RSA1 has become infeasible 
because of generating loss for the manufacturer for 0ET   resulting from the large rebate 
rate. However, Panel (b) and (c) of Figure 2-8 show that RSA2 and RSA3 are feasible for 
7 14ET   months and 2 4ET   months, respectively. Figures 2-6 to 2-8 also 
illustrate that 1 2 3( , ) ( , ) ( , )E E EB T B T B T     for 0.ET   These examples show that for 
small administrative costs of collecting the rebate ,Ic the payer is better off with RSA1 
subject to the existence of feasible solutions for the drug manufacturer. 
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Figure ‎2-8:‎Payer’s‎NMB‎(solid line) and‎manufacturer’s‎profit‎(dashed‎line) for 
α=150%, Dc  ₤4,000,‎and‎ 0.2M Dc c  
                   (a) Under RSA1                                                 (b) Under RSA2 
 
(c) Under RSA3 
             
 
 
 
2.6   Conclusions and Future Research 
I examined the performance of a pay-for-performance risk-sharing agreement similar to 
the agreement for bortezomib in the UK from the perspective of a payer. The parameters 
used in this analysis can be categorized into three groups. The first group consists of the 
rebate rate α, the unit price of the drug ,Dc  the WTP per unit of effectiveness w, and the 
evaluation time .ET  The parameters in this group are usually used to define the terms and 
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conditions in the contract. The second group consists of the drug response rate ,S S   the 
disease progression rate  ,R  the unit production and distribution cost of the drug ,Mc and 
the quality weights of the drug effectiveness ,Sq ˆ ,Sq ,Rq  and .Pq  The parameters in this 
group are related to the characteristics of the drug. The parameters in the third group 
include all costs incurred during the course of treatment (excluding the cost of the drug) 
consisting of the costs of care per unit of time ,Sc ˆ ,Sc  ,Rc and ,Pc  and the 
administrative unit costs Vc  and .Ic  
My analysis in this chapter reveals how different settings among the parameters of these 
three groups affect the NMB of the payer and the existence of a feasible contract with a 
drug manufacturer. Specifically, my analysis of the coefficient ,Bk  which is a function of 
several model parameters, including the payer’s WTP, disease progression rates, QoL and 
unit cost of care in certain health states, and unit costs of the drug and monitoring of 
patients, revealed the following. When 0,Bk   the payer’s NMB is positive without any 
risk-sharing scheme in place, i.e., when α=0. Also when 0Bk   and α=0, the optimal 
evaluation time for both the payer and the drug manufacturer would approach infinity. In 
practice, this means that an evaluation time in the later stages of the treatment would be 
beneficial for both the payer and the manufacturer.  
However, the payer might still want to consider a risk-sharing agreement with the 
manufacturer when 0Bk  for the following reason. I have not incorporated uncertainty in 
my model. Uncertainty in the parameters such as transition rates, cost of care, or QoL can 
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lead to uncertainty in .Bk  As a result of an uncertain ,Bk  it is no longer guaranteed that 
the payer’s NMB would be positive for 0.ET   Thus the payer may consider a risk-
sharing agreement with the drug manufacture to manage this uncertainty. 
 If 0Bk   and α=0, the payer’s NMB will be negative. To compensate for this loss, I 
applied a risk-sharing agreement similar to the bortezomib agreement in the UK and 
analysed the NMB of the payer under the base case rebate classification RSA1 and two 
other rebate classifications RSA2 and RSA3. My analysis showed that there are trade-
offs in choosing the evaluation time for both the payer and the manufacturer, such that its 
optimal value is not obvious. The results from the examples also show that the set of 
evaluation time at which both the payer and the drug manufacturer benefit is sensitive to 
the proportion of collected rebates. This implies that by failing to collect a proportion of 
the rebate, the risk-sharing agreement might not be beneficial to the payer anymore.   
The examples illustrate that for a high price of the drug and a rebate rate that is not large 
enough, RSA1 could possibly be the only feasible contract. By reducing the price of the 
drug, RSA2 and RSA3 could also become feasible. For a high price of the drug and a 
large rebate rate, RSA2 could become the only feasible rebate classification for both 
parties. I also showed that it is not obvious under which rebate classification the payer 
generates the highest NMB, as a higher rebate incurs a higher administrative cost for 
collecting it. Nonetheless, the examples in this chapter demonstrate that when the 
administrative cost of collecting the rebate per non-responding patient is relatively small 
(e.g., Ic  ₤1,000 used in this chapter), the payer is better off with respect to NMB under 
RSA1. However, when both RSA1 and RSA2 are feasible options, RSA2 could be a 
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more reasonable option for both parties to compromise during negotiation. This is 
because RSA2 does not penalize the manufacturer for non-responding patients who had 
responded to the drug before the evaluation time.   
The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence appraisal guidance for the use of 
bortezomib in the UK found that the incremental cost per QALY gained among patients 
with minimal response (i.e., a reduction of 25% to 49% in serum M protein) would be 
very high (NICE, 2007). Thus, a potential extension to the model would be to assume the 
payer (NHS) pays a discounted price when the observed effectiveness is less than 
expected (i.e., minimal response) and then investigate the optimal solution under the new 
contract structure. In this chapter, I have assumed that the monitoring cost is fixed 
throughout the treatment. As an extension to the model, it is possible to assume that 
establishing an optimal patient monitoring scheme is a sub-problem that needs to be 
considered for establishing the optimal evaluation time. 
A potential area of future research would be to investigate the payer’s adverse selection 
under risk-sharing by assuming that there are two drugs for the treatment of the same 
disease (for instance bortezomib and thalidomide used for the first-line treatment of 
multiple myeloma (NICE, 2011)). However, the effectiveness of these drugs is not 
completely the same (i.e., θS, λS, or λR or any combination of these parameters are 
different in these drugs), and they also have different prices.     
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Appendix to Chapter 2 
Derivation of p  
According to the first chapter, 1
m M
D
c
c
    is a threshold for rebate rate, above which 
the manufacturer’s profit becomes negative as ET  approaches infinity. In other words, 
1lim ( , ) 0
E
E
T
T 

 for .
m   Now we show in the following that 
 
( )p I B S R
D R S S
c k
c

  

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 is a threshold for the rebate rate, below which the payer’s NMB 
becomes negative as ET  approaches infinity, i.e., 1lim ( , ) 0
E
E
T
B T

  for ,
p   or 
alternatively,  
1lim ( , ) 0
E
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T
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
 for :
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1 1 1
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From equation (18) for j=1:  lim ( , ) lim ( (1 ( )) ).
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Proof of Proposition 1 
It follows from 
1lim ( , ) 0
E
E
T
B T

 for 
p   that  for 
p   1 [0, )T   such that 
1( , ) 0EB T   for 1.ET T  On the other hand, it follows from 1lim ( , ) 0
E
E
T
T 

 for 
m   that for 
m    2 [0, )T    such that 1( , ) 0ET    for 2;ET T  Thus, for  
,p m      1( , ) 0ET    and 1( , ) 0EB T   for 1 2max( , ).ET T T This in turn implies 
that for ,
p m      there are feasible solutions for both players.  
Q.E.D. 
Lemma A1 
1 2 3R R R     for 0.ET   
Proof of Lemma A1 
1 2R R   for  0,ET   since from (23-b) 2R  can be written as: 
     2
0 0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) . 
E ET T
D D S D E S E
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R c S t R t dt c S t R t dt c T S T   
 
         
Also from the first chapter, 1R  can also be written as: 
   1
0
( ) ( ) .
ET
D D E E
t
R c S t R t dt c T R T  

     It follows from the above statements for 
1R  and 2R  that in order to show 1 2R R   for  0,ET   we need to prove:
      
0
( ) ( )   >0. This is true since:
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E S E E S E
t
T S T R T S t R t dt T
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Since 
0
( ) ( ) 0
ET
E ES t dt T S T   for 0,ET   it follows from (23), i.e.,
       2 01 ( ) + ,
ET
D S E E E ER c S t dt T S T T S T      and 3 ( )D E ER c T S T     that 
2 3R R   for 0.ET   Thus, 1 2 3R R R    for 0.ET   
Q.E.D. 
Lemma A2 
1 2 3I I IC C C   for 0.ET   
Proof of Lemma A2 
To show that 2 3I IC C   for 0,ET   we use the principle of "proof by contradiction". Let 
us assume that  2 3I IC C  for 0.ET   Thus from equations (26) and (27) we have: 
     
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This is not a true inequality since ( ) 1ES T   for 0ET   and also 0 1,S    resulting in 
   1 1 0E SS T    for 0.ET   Thus, 2 3I IC C for 0.ET    
To show that 1 2,I IC C  we calculate the slopes of 1IC  and 2IC  as shown in the 
following: 
1
2
1 2
2
/ ( ) / θ ( ) ( ),
/ θ ( ) / θ ( ) 0.
/ /   (0, )  since ( ) 0 (0, ).
It results from the above statements that  is decreasing in  a
I E E E S S E R E
I E S E E S S E
I E I E E R E E
I E
C T R T T S T R T
C T S T T S T
C T C T T R T T
C T
        
         
            
1
2
nd  is either 
decreasing less than  or is increasing in .
I
I E
C
C T
 
1 2 1 2
Since the treatment has not started yet at 0,  we assumed that 
   0 at 0, i.e.,  and  are discontinuous at 0.
Ignoring the above assumption on discontinuity at 0 results in: 
E
I I E I I E
E
I
T
C C T C C T
T
C

   

1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
1 2 1
  1 at 0;  That is  and  start at the same point at 0.
On the other hand,  lim 1 and lim 1 θ 1, i.e., lim lim .
Thus, from    1 at 0,  lim li
E E E E
E
I E I I E
I I S I I
T T T T
I I E I
T
C T C C T
C C C C
C C T C
   

   
    
    2
1 2 1 2
1 2 2 3 1 2 3
m , and the fact 
that  is  less decreasing than  it follows that   0.
 and  0  0.
E
I
T
I I I I E
I I I I E I I I E
C
C C C C T
C C C C T C C C T

  
        
 
Q.E.D. 
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Chapter 3  
3 Revisiting the Economics of a Pay-for-performance 
Risk-sharing Agreement  
In this chapter I analyse a risk-sharing agreement between a third-party payer and a 
pharmaceutical firm. According to this agreement, patients are prescribed the drug in 
question only if their probability of response to the drug lies within a range of 
probabilities of success. The payer determines this range such that the use of the drug 
becomes cost-effective. The pharmaceutical firm provides the payer with a rebate for 
patients who do not respond to the drug. I generalize on Barros (2011), allowing the 
rebate to be different from the price of the drug, as well as incorporating two types of 
administrative costs. I find a threshold for the rebate rate at which the payoff of the payer 
and the profit of the manufacturer become non-monotonic. I demonstrate that the 
implications of choosing a large rebate rate for the payer will be the unusual policy of 
treating patients with lower probability of response. I also derive the conditions under 
which the payer can choose not to follow the unusual policy while still achieving a 
positive payoff. I show that as administrative costs are reduced and/or the variability in 
the probability of response increases, the risk-sharing agreement becomes welfare-
improving for a wider range of rebate rates compared with no risk-sharing. I also show 
that for a given variability in the probability of response, the risk-sharing agreement 
becomes welfare-improving at a larger rebate rate when the density of patients with lower 
probability of response is higher. I investigate how to eliminate the welfare loss either by 
imposing taxes, by paying subsidies, or through contract by deriving the proper transfer 
payment scheme. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Several expensive drugs have been introduced in the past 10 years. Some examples 
include carfilzomib for relapsed and refractory multiple myeloma, costing $10,000 
(USD) per 28-day cycle (Stenger, 2012); pralatrexate for patients with relapsed or 
refractory peripheral T-cell lymphoma, costing $67,500 (USD) per each 7-week cycle 
(Hui et al., 2012); and bevacizumab for the treatment of breast, colon, lung, and brain 
cancer, costing up to $100,000 (USD) a year (Jirillo et al., 2008).   
At the time of introduction, the effectiveness of these drugs is often unproven outside of 
clinical trials. This creates a risk to third-party payers, as the outcomes of these drugs in 
real-world practice is highly uncertain ex-ante. As a result, payers may be reluctant to 
cover them.    
These issues have prompted many payers to consider pay-for-performance risk-sharing 
agreements as an innovative approach that enables the risk associated with inclusion of 
these drugs in the formulary to be shared between the payer and the drug manufacturer. 
As the implementation of pharmaceutical pay-for-performance risk-sharing agreements 
grows (Adamski et al., 2010; Carlson et al., 2010), so does the need for detailed analysis 
on the economics of these agreements. Two important considerations of any economic 
analysis are when an agreement (in this case, a pay-for-performance risk-sharing 
agreement) is beneficial to both parties (in this case, the payer and the manufacturer) and 
when it becomes welfare-improving.  
Barros (2011) studied the economics of a pay-for-performance risk-sharing agreement in 
which a new treatment is prescribed to a patient whose probability of response is higher 
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than a cut-off probability. The drug manufacturer then provides a rebate to the payer for 
all sales for patients who did not respond. He assumed that the drug manufacturer is a 
monopolist who sets the price of the drug and compared the utility for the payer and the 
profit for the drug manufacturer in two scenarios: risk-sharing and no risk-sharing.  He 
showed that, depending on when a risk-sharing agreement is negotiated (i.e., before or 
after the price has been set for the drug), the agreement may increase or decrease social 
welfare. Using a similar model, Antonanzas et al. (2011) assumed that the price of the 
new drug is determined through a negotiation between the payer and the drug 
manufacturer and showed that the optimal contract depends on the trade-off among the 
monitoring costs, the marginal production cost, and the utility derived from treatment.  
In this chapter I generalize on Barros (2011) in two ways. First I allow the rebate rate to 
be any value, whereas Barros (2011) assumed it was 100%. The payer might choose a 
rebate rate greater than 100% when there is a possibility that the payer also incurs some 
extra costs arising from treating a non-responding patient with the drug (e.g., costs related 
to hospital care, pharmacy dispensing, or side effects of the drug). Second, in addition to 
the administrative cost of verifying whether each patient receiving the drug is responding 
(which was included in Barros (2011)), I assume that there is an administrative cost for 
collecting (invoicing) the rebate for every non-responding patient.  
This chapter makes the following contributions. First, I find a threshold for the rebate rate 
at which the payoff of the payer and the profit of the manufacturer become non-
monotonic. Second, I show that the implications of choosing a large rebate rate for the 
payer will be the perverse incentive policy of treating patients with lower probability of 
response. Third, I derive the conditions where the payer can choose not to follow the 
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respective perverse incentive policy while still achieving a positive payoff. Fourth, I 
show that as administrative costs are reduced and/or the variability in the probability of 
response increases, the risk-sharing agreement becomes welfare-improving for a wider 
range of rebate rates compared with no risk-sharing. Fifth, I also show that for a given 
variability in the probability of response, the risk-sharing agreement becomes welfare-
improving at a larger rebate rate when the density of patients with lower probability of 
response is higher. And sixth, I show how to eliminate the welfare loss by imposing 
taxes, by paying subsidies, or through contract by deriving the proper transfer payment 
scheme.  
In section 2 of this chapter, I derive the optimal solutions for the payer and the drug 
manufacturer. In section 3, I examine a number of examples to evaluate the performance 
of risk-sharing at optimal points. In section 4, I analyse the situation in which the price is 
fixed. In section 5, I calculate the optimal social welfare from the perspective of a social 
planner and explore some of the transfer payment methods to achieve that optimal 
solution. In section 6, I make my concluding remarks.  
3.2 The Model 
I use Barros (2011) approach to model patients’ response to a new drug. Let π be the 
probability of success per patient, 0 1,   which can be observed by physicians prior to 
treatment. Because of heterogeneity in response to the drug throughout the patient 
population, I allow π to be randomly distributed between 0 and 1. For mathematical 
convenience I assume that π is continuous with probability density function f(.) and 
cumulative distribution function F(.). As in Barros (2011), I assume that physicians are 
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perfect agents of the payer, and thus the interactions between the three parties—
physicians, the manufacturer, and the payer—can be simplified to interactions between 
the payer and the manufacturer. Let b be the monetary benefit to the payer from the 
successful response of a patient to the new drug, 0.b   For example, b could be the 
quality-adjusted life years gained by a patient multiplied by the payer’s willingness-to-
pay (WTP) per unit gained. Let Vc  be the administrative cost for verifying whether or not 
each patient receiving the drug is responding, 0.Vc   I assume Vc  is incurred by the 
payer. Let w be the marginal production and distribution cost of the drug incurred by the 
manufacturer, 0.w   
Table ‎3-1: Table of model parameters 
ITEMS DESCRIPTIONS 
π Probability of response to the drug 
L, U Lower and upper cut-off probabilities 
* *,L U  Optimal lower and upper cut-off probabilities 
,C CL U  Optimal cut-off probabilities from social planner perspective 
f(π), F(π) Probability density and probability distribution functions for π 
μπ Expected value of π 
,P MV V  Expected payoff of the payer and the profit of the manufacturer 
* *,P MV V  Optimal expected payoff and optimal expected profit 
~
MV  Reservation profit for the manufacturer 
ˆ ˆ,P MV V  
Payoff of the payer and the profit of the manufacturer after the payment 
transfer 
p, p
* 
Price of the drug, optimal price 
Vc  Verification cost (all patients are subjected to) 
Ic  Rebate invoicing cost (only non-respondents are subjected to) 
w Manufacturing and distribution cost of the drug 
α Rebate rate 
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As in Barros (2011), I assume that the manufacturer is a monopolist and thus sets the 
price p of the drug, 0.p   Under the risk-sharing agreement discussed in this chapter, 
the drug manufacturer rebates to the payer a proportion α of the sales of the drug from a 
non-responding patient, 0.   I assume that α is fixed by the payer exogenously and 
that α could be larger than 1. Let Ic  be the administrative cost for collecting (invoicing) 
the rebate for every non-responding patient, 0.Ic   I assume Ic  is also incurred by the 
payer. The timeline of the decisions is such that first the manufacturer sets the price p. 
Then similar to Zaric (2008), I assume that the payer decides on a lower and an upper 
cut-off probability, L and U, such that patients whose probability of response lies 
between these two cut-off probabilities will be prescribed the drug (i.e., the drug is only 
available if ).L U   Under normal circumstances we would expect 1.U   However, 
we allow an upper bound U, 0 1,U   because for large α, treatment by the drug 
becomes cost-effective for patients with lower probability of response. I have included 
the unusual case of 1U  in my analysis to explore the implications of having a large 
exogenous rebate rate. 
Let PV  be the expected payer’s payoff and MV be the expected manufacturer’s profit: 
  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ,
    ( ) , (1)
U
P V I V
L
U
L
V b p c p c p c f d
d n f d
    
  
       
  


 
where ( )Id b p c    and ( ).V In p c p c     
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In (1) d is the difference to the payer between the benefit of a responding patient, b, and 
the net benefit of a non-responding patient ( );Ip c   and n is the difference between the 
cost of a responding patient ( )Vp c  and the benefit of a non-responding patient 
( ).Ip c   Positive d implies that the benefit of a respondent is higher than the net 
benefit of a non-respondent ( ),Ib p c  whereas negative d implies that the net benefit 
of a non-respondent is higher than the benefit of a respondent to the payer ( ).Ib p c   
Positive n implies that the cost of a respondent is higher than the benefit of a non-
responding patient ( ),V Ip c p c   whereas negative n implies that the benefit of a 
non-responding patient is higher than the cost of a respondent to the payer 
( ).V Ip c p c      
To analyse the payoff of the payer as a function of the probability of response, I use 
equation (1) to obtain the following equation for the payoff of the payer for a given π: 
.PV d n    In Figure 3-1, the payoff of the payer is depicted as a function of π for 
four different combinations of the parameters d and n. For all these cases I have assumed 
that b=1. Panel (a) of Figure 3-1 shows the payoff when model parameters (i.e., α, p, ,Vc  
and )Ic are chosen such that they result in the following two cases: 1. d>0 and n>0, and 
2. d>0 and n<0.  As shown in this panel, for d>0 and n>0, the payoff of the payer is non-
negative if ,n d  and for d>0 and n<0, the payoff is always non-negative (i.e., all 
patients will be treated).   
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Panel (b) of Figure 3-1 shows the payoff for d<0 and n<0, as well as for d<0 and n>0.  
This panel illustrates that for d>0 and n<0, the payoff is always negative (i.e., no patient 
will be treated) while for d<0 and n<0, the payoff of the payer becomes non-negative if 
.n d   The latter case results in an unusual case in which patients who are less likely 
to respond will be treated. However, the payer can decide to treat all patients and still 
make a positive payoff if the area under the line depicting the payoff of the payer for π, 
0 1,  is positive.  
 
Figure ‎3-1: PV d n     as‎a‎function‎of‎π 
(a) d>0 and n>0 (solid line) and  
d>0 and n<0 (dashed line) 
(b) d<0 and n<0 (solid line) and    
d<0 and n>0 (dashed line) 
 
Let MV be the expected manufacturer’s profit: 
 
 
( ) ( )(1 ) ( ) ,    
     (1 ) ( ) , (2)
U
M
L
U
L
V p w p p w f d
p p w f d
    
    
     
    


 
The setup of the problem is based on a Stackelberg game, in which the manufacturer acts 
as the leader and determines the optimal price 
*p for the drug to maximize its expected 
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profit. Then the payer chooses the optimal cut-off probabilities, *L  and *,U  which 
maximize its expected payoff.  The problem is solved in reverse time sequence.  Thus in 
the first step of the analysis, we find the optimal decisions by the payer for a given p, i.e., 
*L and *,U by solving the following optimization problem: 
,
(OP1) max
s.t. 0 1, 
0 1,                                                                                                              
P
L U
V
L
U
 
 
 
where PV  is given according to equation (1).  
In the second step of the analysis, we find the drug manufacturer’s optimal price
*p for 
given *L and *U  by solving the following optimization problem: 
* *,
(OP2) max
s.t. 0, 
0,                                                                                                 
M
p
P L L U U
V
p
V
 


 
where PV  and MV are given according to equations (1) and (2), respectively. 
As in Barros (2011), there is no closed-form solution for
*p in general. However, when π 
is uniformly distributed 
*p will be the roots of a cubic equation resulting from the first 
order condition (see Appendix). Also for a given π, there is a closed form solution for
*p
(see Appendix). Let ( ) ( )T I Vb c b c    be a threshold value for the rebate rate. The 
optimum decisions by the payer for a given p (i.e., *L and 
*)U are summarized in      
Table 3-2.   
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Table ‎3-2: Scenarios for optimal cut-off probabilities for a given price 
 d>0 
( )Ib p c 
 
d<0 
( )Ib p c   
 
d=0 
( )Ib p c    
n>0 
(
)
V
I
p c
p c
 

 
0   
*L n d , 
* 1U          
( 0)d n 
1 
No patients will be treated since
0PV   for π, 0 1   
  0
(
)
V
I
n
p c
p c

 

 
 
0 1   Not feasible since no p to satisfy 0p   
1 T    
 
Not Possible 
2 
* 0L  , 
*U n d   
( 0)d n      
 
Not Possible 
2 
T 
 
* 0L  , * 1U 
                                                     
   
* 0,L               
*U n d for 
0,d n   
* 1U   for 
0n d  3 
* 0,L   * 1U           
n=0                
(
)
V
I
p c
p c
 

  
0 1   Not feasible since no p to satisfy 0p   
1   
* 0,L  * 1;U 
 
                                    
T   
No patients will 
be treated since 
0PV   for π, 
0 1   
* 0,L  * 1;U 
4
         
,Vp b c 
T  , 0PV   
 
1
 If ,Vp b c  then 0.d n   If Vp b c   (i.e., 0),n d  then 0PV   for π, 0 1, 
i.e., no patients will be treated for  .Vp b c   
2
 Not possible since
1
V I Ic c b cp
 
 
 

 or 
1
I V Ib c c cp
 
 
 

results in .T   
 3
 If Vp b c   (i.e., 0),n d  then 1n d   and consequently 
* 1,U  i.e. all patients will 
be treated.
 
It is to be noted that 0n d   only if .T   
4
 If Vp b c  when ,T  then 0.n d   It follows from 0n d  that 0pV  for 
*,L  
*0 1,L   and *,U *0 1.U  Presumably the payer chooses to treat all patients, i.e., 
* 0L  and * 1.U      
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We begin with two general observations. First, for 0,n  the optimal choice of the payer 
depends on whether T   or .T   Second, regardless of the (probability) density of 
the probability of response, the marginal payoff to the payer from a patient depends 
solely on the administrative costs, price, and benefit of the drug, and the given probability 
of response. This implies that the payer's payoff will be maximized when any patient 
(with a given probability of response) who generates a negative marginal payoff is 
excluded from being treated by the drug.   
Depending on the values of α, p, ,Vc  and ,Ic  d and n can take any real values in equation 
(1). In the following section I review the cases shown in Table 3-2 with regard to the 
values taken by d and n and the subsequent optimal decisions by the payer. 
3.2.1 Payer’s Optimal Decisions 
First we consider the case in which 0   and  p  has been chosen such that 0d   and 
0n  (i.e., ( )Ip b c    for 1,   or min{( ) ,Ip b c   ( ) ( 1)}V Ic c    for 1).   
This is similar to the case presented by Barros (2011) for which 1.   The condition 
0d   and 0n  implies that the net benefit of a non-responding patient to the payer is 
smaller than the benefit and also the cost of a responding patient (i.e., min{ ,Ip c b  
}).Vp c  If the price chosen by the manufacturer also satisfies ,Vp b c   which implies 
that the benefit of a responding patient to the payer is at least equal to the cost of the 
respective patient, then 0.d n   It follows from 0d n   that 0d n    for π, 
1,n d    which implies that the optimal decision for the payer is to choose 
*L n d  
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and * 1U  (the formal proof is presented in the Appendix). Note that if ,Vp b c   then 
0,n d   therefore 0PV   for π, 0 1.  This would violate the manufacturer’s 
constraint, meaning that the manufacturer would not choose any price in this range. 
The next case is when 1   and the manufacturer chooses p such that 0d  and 0n   
(i.e., max{( ) ,Ip b c    ( ) ( 1)}).V Ic c    As will be described in the next 
paragraph, the optimal solution for the payer under this case is to treat patients with lower 
probability of response (i.e., ).n d   This is an unusual case. However, I have included 
it in this analysis to highlight the policy implications of setting a too-large rebate rate.  
The condition 0d   and 0n  would imply that the net benefit of a non-responding 
patient to the payer is greater than the benefit and also the cost of a responding patient 
(i.e., max{ ,Ip c b   }).Vp c  It follows from 0d  and 0n  that 0d n    for π, 
0 .n d   This conclusion implies that the optimal decision for the payer is to choose 
* 0L  and 
*U n d  for 0,d n   or * 0L  and * 1U  for 0.n d   Note that 
0d n   if ,Vp b c   which in turn implies that the payer will choose the “perverse 
incentive” policy of treating patients whose n d  if the benefit of a responding patient 
to the payer is smaller than the respective cost ( ).Vb p c   Under certain conditions for 
this case, the payer can extend the coverage of the drug to all patients while still 
achieving a positive payoff (see Proposition 1).  
We continue with the following cases: 0d  and 0n  (i.e., ( )Ip b c    while 
( ) ( 1)),V Ip c c    and 0d  and 0n   (i.e., ( ) ( 1)V Ip c c     ( ) ).Ib c   The 
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condition 0d  and 0n   implies that the benefit of a responding patient is at least equal 
to the net benefit of a non-responding patient, which is greater than the cost of the 
respective responding patient (i.e., ).I Vb p c p c     The condition 0d  and 0n 
implies that the benefit of a responding patient to the payer is greater than the cost of the 
respective patient, which is equal to the net benefit of a non-responding patient (i.e., 
).V Ib p c p c     It follows from 0d  and 0,n   or 0d  and 0n  , that 
0d n    for 0,  implying that all patients will be treated, i.e., * 0L  and * 1.U     
We continue further with the following cases: 0d  and 0n  (i.e., ( )Ip b c    for 
1,   or  ( )Ip b c    and ( ) ( 1)V Ip c c    for 1),  and 0d  and 0n  (i.e., 
( ) ( 1)V Ip c c     ( ) ).Ib c   The condition 0d  and 0n  implies that the benefit 
of a responding patient is at most equal to the net benefit of a non-responding patient, 
which itself is smaller than the cost of the respective responding patient (i.e., 
).I Vb p c p c     The condition 0d  and 0n  implies that the benefit of a 
responding patient to the payer is smaller than the cost of the respective patient, which 
itself is equal to the net benefit of a non-responding patient (i.e., ).I Vb p c p c     
For these cases 0PV   for π, 0 1   (since 0).d n   This would violate the 
manufacturer’s constraint, meaning that the manufacturer would not choose any price 
leading to these cases.  
Finally, we consider the case when the manufacturer chooses p such that 0,n d   
implying that  the net benefit of a non-responding patient to the payer is equal to the 
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benefit and also to the cost of a responding patient,  i.e., .I Vp c b p c      It is 
straightforward to show that 0n d  could only happen when the manufacturer chooses 
the price Vp b c   and .T    Therefore, if the manufacturer chooses Vp b c   when 
,T   then 0.n d   It follows from 0n d   that 0PV  , i.e., the payer would 
become indifferent to any combinations of *,L  *0 1,L   and *,U *0 1,U   subject to 
* *.U L From the health policy perspective, 0PV   implies that the payer pays exactly 
for the benefits obtained at its WTP. In this chapter I assume that for 0,n d   the payer 
chooses * 0L  and * 1.U   As noted, there is no closed-form solution for the optimal 
price 
*.p  However, in all examples presented later,  * Vp b c  for .T     
3.2.2 Payer’s Alternative Decision when U*<1 
The solutions found with * 1U   (i.e., the optimal decision for the payer would be to treat 
patients with lower probability of response) might be unacceptable from a policy 
perspective. Thus the payer may decide to relax *,U  such that all patients are treated (i.e., 
0L  and 1).U   Proposition 1 describes the condition for 0PV   (i.e., when the payer 
still derives some benefit).  
Proposition 1: 
Let 1,    ,E  and p such that 0.d n   If ,n d  0L  , and 1,U   then 
0.pV   
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Thus according to Proposition 1, if 0d n   and n d   then the payer may decide 
not to follow the optimal strategy and treat all patients (i.e., 0L  and 1)U   while still 
achieving a non-negative expected payoff ( 0).pV   
3.2.3 Impacts of Changes in p on L* or U*=n/d 
In this section I investigate how an increase in p would affect the payer’s decisions for 
the cases when 
*L n d  and * 1U  for ,T   and when 
* 0L  and 
*U n d  for 
T   (see Table 3-2 for the corresponding conditions on the price p). In these cases, if 
the manufacturer increases the price p while the conditions on p remain unchanged, then 
the payer will choose to treat fewer patients (by adjusting the respective cut-off 
probability).  
Furthermore, I consider the cases when 
*L n d  and * 1U  for ,T   and when 
* 0L   and 
*U n d  for α, 1 T    (see Table 3-2 for the corresponding conditions 
on the price p). For these cases, if the manufacturer increases the price p while the 
conditions on p remain unchanged, then the payer will conversely choose to treat more 
patients (Lemma 1; proof in Appendix).  
Lemma 1: 
If ,T  then 
*  L n d  is increasing in p. If 1 ,T    then 
*U n d  is increasing in 
p. If ,T   then 
* * or L U n d  is decreasing in p.  
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3.2.4 Social Welfare 
I define the social welfare function to be equivalent to the sum of the expected payer’s 
payoff and the expected manufacturer’s profit, i.e., .P MS V V   Incorporating equations 
(1) and (2) in S for PV  and MV , respectively, yields the following welfare equation: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) . (3)
U
I V I
L
S b c w c c f d        
 
The following proposition shows the conditions under which the social welfare is always 
positive or negative. 
Proposition 2: 
(a) In the normal case where 0L   and 1,U   if 
( )
,
( )
V I V I
I I
n p c p c w c c
d b p c b c


    
 
  
then 0.S   
(b) In the high rebate case (associated with the perverse incentive policy) where 0L   
and 1,U   if 
( )
,
( )
V I V I
I I
n p c p c w c c
d b p c b c


    
 
  
 then 0.S   
Note that (a) and (b) in Proposition 2 are not necessary conditions, i.e., it is still possible 
to obtain 0S  or 0S   without the corresponding condition being met.  
3.3 Examples 
In this section I examine a number of examples to evaluate the performance of p*, 
*,PV  
and 
*
MV  as functions of the rebate rate α. I use a beta distribution for π since this 
distribution is defined on the interval [0,1]  and it is very flexible and can be used to 
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model both symmetric and skewed distributions. I normalize the benefit of the drug 1b 
and assume that all other costs are relative to this value and can be scaled up or down.  
In Figure  3-2, 0.01,Vc  0.001,Ic   and w=0.1. Panels (a) and (b) of this figure show 
*L
and *U for π~β(1,1) (which is equivalent to a uniform distribution with 0.5)  and 
π~β(2,5) (which is a right-skewed distribution with 0.286),   respectively. Both 
panels illustrates that * 1L  and * 1U   for ,T   
* 0L  and * 1U   for ,T  and 
* 0L  and * 1U   for .T   Also, it can be seen from both panels that  
*U  for 
.T   Thus, by the implication of Proposition 1, the payer can choose not to follow the 
optimal decision (i.e., treating patients with lower probability of response) and instead 
choose to treat all patients and still obtain a positive payoff.   
Figure ‎3-2: *L (solid line) and *U (dashed‎line)‎as‎functions‎of‎α‎for‎ 0.01,Vc 
0.001,Ic  and w=0.1 ( 1.011)T   
(a)‎π~β(1,1), 0.5                                       (b)‎π~β(2,5),‎ 0.286   
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The results from Figure 3-2 also show that in these examples the following cases from 
Table 3-2 are not feasible after obtaining the optimal p: 
* 0L   and *U n d  for α, 
1 ,T   and 
*L n d  and * 1U   for .T  These results remain valid for the rest of 
examples used in this section. 
In Figure 3-3 and Figure 3-4 π~β(1,1) and w=0.1. Also, 0.05Vc   and 0.005Ic   in 
Figure 3-3 and 0.01Vc  and 0.001Ic  in Figure 3-4. Panel (a) of both figures shows 
*
PV
(dotted line), 
*
MV (dashed line), and total social welfare 
* *
P MV V (solid line) as functions of 
α. Panel (a) also shows ,eq a threshold at which risk-sharing becomes welfare-improving 
when compared with no risk-sharing. Panel (b) of both figures shows 
*p  as a function of 
α.  The respective values under no risk-sharing (i.e., when 0,  0Vc  , and 0)Ic   are 
shown with solid dashes. The hollow circle in each panel shows the case where α=0, but 
0Vc   and/or 0Ic   (representing a hypothetical situation where administrative costs 
are incurred but the rebate is zero). 
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Figure ‎3-3: p*, *,PV
* ,MV and 
* *
P MV V  as‎functions‎of‎α‎for‎π~β(1,1),‎ 0.05,Vc 
0.005,Ic  and w=0.1 
(a) *
PV (dotted line),
*
MV (dashed line), and                    
    * *
P MV V (solid line) as functions of                       (b) p
*
 as‎a‎function‎of‎rebate‎rate‎α  
                       rebate rate‎α 
 
 
Figure ‎3-4:  p*, *,PV
* ,MV and 
* *
P MV V  as‎functions‎of‎α‎for‎π~β(1,1),‎ 0.01,Vc 
0.001,Ic  and w=0.1 
(a) 
*
PV (dotted line),
*
MV  (dashed line), and                    
    
* *
P MV V (solid line) as functions of                       (b)  p
*
 as‎a‎function‎of‎rebate‎rate‎α‎ 
                       rebate‎rate‎α 
 
Panel (a) in Figure 3-3 and Figure 3-4 shows that 
*
PV is decreasing in .T   This is 
because *L is decreasing in ,T   i.e., the proportion of patients who are less likely to 
respond will become higher among those to be treated while the benefit of each marginal 
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non-responding patient is negative to the payer.  On the other hand, 
*
PV  is increasing in 
.T   This is due to the fact that 
*U is decreasing in ,T   which also implies a 
higher proportion of patients who are less likely to respond among those to be treated. 
However, conversely in this case the benefit of each marginal non-responding patient is 
positive to the payer because of high rebate.                                                     
 Similarly, panel (a) in Figure 3-3 and Figure 3-4 shows that 
*
MV is increasing in .T 
This is also because *L is decreasing in ,T   which results in more patients being 
treated while each marginal responding patient is profitable to the drug manufacturer. 
Additionally, each marginal non-responding patient is profitable to the drug manufacturer 
when ( ) .p w p     On the other hand, *MV  is decreasing in .T  This is also owing 
to the fact that 
*U is decreasing in .T   As a result, the proportion of patients who are 
less likely to respond will become higher among those to be treated while each marginal 
non-responding patient is non-profitable to the drug manufacturer.   
The plots for 
*
MV  also suggest that if in addition to the price, the rebate rate were also a 
decision variable for the drug manufacturer, then the manufacturer would choose 
*
T   
(where 
* denotes the optimal rebate rate) and * .Vp b c  However, this decision is 
subject to the condition that the payer chooses to treat all patients when it becomes 
indifferent to any combinations of 
* *0 1.L U    
Panel (a) of Figure 3-3 shows that 0.8,eq   whereas the same panel in Figure 3-4 shows 
that 0.2.eq  On the other hand, the administrative costs in Figure 3-4 are lower than 
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those costs in Figure 3-3. All other parameters are identical in these two figures. This 
implies that the risk-sharing agreement becomes welfare-improving at a lower rebate rate 
as the administrative costs are reduced. 
Panel (b) in Figure 3-3 and Figure 3-4 shows that
*p  under no risk-sharing (shown with 
solid dash) is larger than 
*p when α=0 but Vc  or Ic  are non-zero (shown with hollow 
circle). This difference becomes larger as Vc  or Ic  increases (i.e., Figure 3-3 compared 
with Figure 3-3). This may occur because the optimal cut-off 
*L n d is increasing in 
both Vc and Ic  (i.e., as Vc  or Ic  increases, fewer patients will be treated). If the marginal 
patient is profitable to the drug manufacturer, then the optimal decision by the 
manufacturer would be to decrease the price to offset the increase in *L that was induced 
by an increase in Vc  or .Ic  
For the next examples we assume that 0.01,Vc  0.001,Ic   and w=0.1. Figure  3-5 shows 
p* as a function of the rebate rate α for the following distributions for π: β(2,2) (solid 
line), β(5,5) (dashed line), right-skewed β(2,5) (dotted line), and left-skewed β(5,2) 
(dashed-dotted line). As depicted in Figure  3-5, 
*p is increasing in T   since the 
optimal decision by the manufacturer is to increase the price to offset the loss induced by 
the increased rebate rate. This figure also shows that for a given ,T  the price for a 
right-skewed distribution is the smallest. This is due to the fact that for a high price, few 
patients will be treated under a right-skewed distribution (since *L is large). By reducing 
the price, the manufacturer allows more patients to be treated while each marginal 
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responding patient as well as each marginal non-responding patient when 
( ) )p w p   is profitable to the drug manufacturer.   
Figure ‎3-5: p* as‎a‎function‎of‎rebate‎rate‎α‎for‎ 0.01,Vc  0.001,Ic   w=0.1, 
symmetric‎π~β(2,2)‎(solid‎line),‎symmetric‎π~β(5,5)‎(dashed‎line),‎right-skewed 
π~β(2,5)‎(dotted‎line),‎and‎left-skewed‎π~β(5,2)‎(dashed-dotted line)  
 
As also shown in Figure  3-5, 
*p is increasing much faster in T  for symmetric 
distributions with smaller variances (e.g., β(5,5)) and asymmetric right-skewed 
distributions (e.g., β(2,5)) than 
*p for symmetric distributions with larger variances (e.g., 
β(1,1) and β(2,2)) and asymmetric left-skewed distributions (e.g., β(5,2)). This pattern 
may occur because the proportion of patients who are less likely to respond will become 
higher among those to be treated when the distribution of π is right-skewed or has a 
smaller variance (i.e., 
*U is smaller). Since each marginal non-responding patient is non-
profitable to the manufacturer, the optimal decision by the manufacturer under these 
types of distributions would be to increase the price. This in turn results in fewer patients 
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including fewer non-responding patients being treated (since 
*U  decreases) and as a 
result less loss will be induced.  
We define eq as a threshold for α, above which risk-sharing is welfare-improving. Panel 
(a) of Figure 3-6 shows the variations of eq with respect to the variance of the 
probability of response. Three distributions are shown: the symmetric (solid line), right-
skewed (dashed line), and left-skewed (dotted line) beta distributions. In this figure I 
have used π~β(2k,5k) and π~β(5k,2k) for the creation of the right-skewed distributions 
with μπ=2/7 and the left-skewed distributions with μπ=5/7, respectively, where k=1, 2, 3, 
5, and 10. For a given variance of π, eq is greater for a right-skewed distribution because 
a right-skewed distribution has a higher density of patients with lower probability of 
response. This in turn induces a higher number of non-responding patients to be treated, 
which in turn could result in the risk-sharing agreement to become welfare-improving at 
larger rebate rates.  
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Figure ‎3-6: eq and 
*L  versus‎the‎variance‎of‎π‎for‎ 0.01,Vc  0.001,Ic   w=0.1, 
symmetrical‎π~β(k,k) where k=1, 2, 5, 20, and 50 (solid line); right-skewed 
π~β(2k,5k) where k=1, 2, 3, 5, and 10 (dashed line); and left-skewed‎π~β(5k,2k) 
where k=1, 2, 3, 5, and 10 (dotted line) 
        (a) eq versus‎variance‎of‎π                       (b) L
*
 versus‎variance‎of‎π‎for α=0.5  
 
Also for all three types of beta distribution presented in panel (a) of Figure 3-6, eq  is 
decreasing (i.e., the risk-sharing starts to be welfare-improving at a smaller rebate rate) in 
the variance of π. This pattern can be explained by panel (b) in Figure 3-6, in which *L is 
depicted versus variance of π for 0.5.   All other parameters are the same in both 
panels. As shown in panel (b), for a given α, *L  is increasing in larger variances of π for 
all three types of distribution. This implies that a smaller number of non-responding 
patients will be treated in larger variances of π, which in turn induces the risk-sharing to 
become welfare-improving at a smaller rebate rate. This result is consistent with the 
results shown for eq in panel (a) for all three types of distribution. The effect of 
changing the variance of π in the number of patients treated is illustrated in Figure  3-7.  
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Figure ‎3-7:‎Effect‎of‎changing‎variance‎of‎π‎on‎the‎number‎of‎patients‎treated‎
resulting from *L for‎π~β(2,2)‎(solid‎line;‎Var[π]=0.05)‎and‎π~β(20,20)‎(dashed‎line;‎
Var[π]=0.006)‎when‎ 0.5,   0.01,Vc  0.001,Ic   and w=0.1 
 
3.4 Risk-Sharing Policy Not Known in Advance 
I now consider the case in which the manufacturer sets the price of the drug before the 
payer announces α. There are two possibilities: either the manufacturer anticipates a risk-
sharing scenario and thus sets a price higher than the optimal price of the drug under no 
risk-sharing; or the manufacture does not anticipate any risk-sharing. The former case is 
similar to the case presented in section 2, which leads to the optimization problems (OP1) 
and (OP2). I analyse the latter case in more detail in the following section.  
3.4.1 Manufacturer Anticipates No Risk-sharing 
In this case the manufacturer determines p as if there were no risk-sharing (i.e., 0,   
0,Vc  and 0).Ic   Let (0)PV  and (0)MV denote the payoff of the payer and the profit of 
the manufacturer in this scenario, respectively. It follows from (1) and (2) that  
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where 0d b  and 0 .n p  
The setup of the problem is such that the manufacturer acts as the leader and determines 
the optimal price and then the payer chooses the optimal cut-off probabilities. Using 
backwards induction we find the optimal decisions for the payer under the no risk-sharing 
scenario for a given p, i.e., 
*
0L  and 
*
0 ,U  by solving the following optimization problem: 
,
(OP3) max (0)
s.t. 0 1, 
0 1.                                                                                                              
P
L U
V
L
U
 
 
 
Then we find 
*
0 ,p  the drug manufacturer’s optimal price under the no risk-sharing 
scenario for given 
*
0L  and 
*
0 ,U  by solving the following optimization problem: 
* *
0 0,
(OP4) max (0)
s.t. 0, 
(0) 0.                                                                                                 
M
p
P L U
V
p
V


 
To find the payer’s optimal cut-off probabilities when α is introduced, the payer needs to 
solve the optimization problem of (OP1) by replacing p with 
*
0 .p  As shown in        
Figure 3-8, it is possible for the payer to benefit from this special case since the 
manufacturer determines p as if there were no risk-sharing (i.e., 
*
0 ).p p  The solid line in 
Figure 3-8 shows 
* *
0( , ),PV p i.e., the optimal payoff for the payer when the price p is 
fixed at 
*
0 0.55p  (i.e., the optimal price under no risk-sharing). In this figure π~β(1,1), 
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0.05,Vc  0.005,Ic  and w=0.1. The solid dash shows that the payoff of the payer under 
no risk-sharing (denoted as 
0K on the graph) is equal to 0.101. As depicted in this figure, 
* *
0( , )PV p  is increasing in α for the given 
*
0 0.55.p   Proposition 3 outlines the 
condition for α in which the payer’s payoff with the fixed price 
*
0p p  becomes larger 
than the payer’s payoff under no risk-sharing (i.e., 
* *
0 0( , ) ).PV p K   
Figure ‎3-8: *
PV  (solid line) as a function‎of‎α‎with‎π~β(1,1),‎ 0.05,Vc  0.005,Ic 
w=0.1, and price fixed at p=0.55 (dashed line shows *
PV  when 
*p p for each α) 
 
Proposition 3: 
Let 
*
0p  and 0K  denote the optimal price of the drug and the optimal payoff of the payer 
under the no risk-sharing scenario, i.e., when 0,   0,Vc   and 0,Ic   respectively. 
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For a given
*
0 ,p p  there is a threshold 0,F   such that 
* *
0 0( , )PV p K   if ,F  and 
* *
0 0( , )PV p K   if .F   
Proposition 3 implies that the payer may still be worse off with risk-sharing in spite of the 
manufacturer choosing a price as if there were no risk-sharing.  For example Figure 3-8 
shows that the expected payoff of the payer under risk-sharing with 0.35F    and 
0.55p   is always less than 0 0.101.K   
It is easy to show that 
*L n d  is decreasing and 
*U n d  is increasing in α under a 
fixed price scheme (Lemma 2, Appendix). Thus if α increases when 
*L n d  and * 1U   
or * 0L  and 
*U n d (while p is fixed), then the payer will choose to treat more 
patients by adjusting the respective cut-off probability.  
3.5 Social Welfare Maximization 
Let S
C denote the welfare function when the social planner chooses the “coordinated” cut-
off probabilities CL  and CU  resulting in the following:  
       = ( ) ( ) ( ) . (4)
C
C
C C C
P M
U
I V I
L
S V V
b c w c c f d  
 
   
    
It follows from (4) that when ,Vb w c   then 1
CU   is always the optimal upper cut-
off probability. For ,Vb w c  0,
C CL U   meaning that no patients will be treated.  
For the rest of this analysis I assume that Vb w c   and obtain the optimal 
( ) ( )C V I IL w c c b c     by using the first-order condition 0.
C CS L    Since CS  is 
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the optimal value for S, 0.CS S   For 0,CS S  there is a welfare loss owing to the 
deviation from the social planner’s optimal cut-off probability as both parties optimize 
separately. In the next sections I investigate two methods for reducing or eliminating this 
welfare loss. The first method is based on adjusting some of the existing cost parameters 
through taxes or subsidies and the second method is based on assigning a transfer 
payment function between the payer and the drug manufacturer through a properly 
designed contract.  
3.5.1 Payment Schemes Based on Adjusted Cost Parameters  
Barros (2011) examined the scenario in which the social planner imposes a verification 
cost in order to achieve the first-case allocation. In the context of this chapter we assume 
that the social planner imposes a verification cost V or an administrative cost for 
invoicing the rebate I  to achieve the first-best allocation. Similar to Barros (2011), if 
these costs are less or more than the true costs  ( Vc and ),Ic then we allow the social 
planner to subsidize or to tax them, respectively. 
First we assume that the social planner imposes a verification cost V and then the drug 
manufacture chooses the price ( ).Vp   Let  
* ˆˆ ˆ( ) /VL p n d  (or alternatively 
 * ˆˆ ˆ( )VU p n d   for the case where ˆ 0n  and 
ˆ 0)d   be the optimal cut-off probability 
chosen by the payer, where  ˆ ( ) ( )V V V In p p c        and  ˆ ( ) .V Id b p c   
The first-order condition of the coordinated social welfare function with regard to V (i.e., 
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0)C VS     results in the following relation for eliminating the welfare loss: 
*ˆ CL L
(see Appendix for details). 
Similarly, we could assume that the social planner chooses the administrative cost for 
invoicing .I  Let ( )Ip   be the price and let  
* ( ) /IL p n d   be the optimal cut-off 
probability, where  ( ) ( )I V I In p c p        and  ( ) .I Id b p     In this case 
0C IS     results in 
* CL L  for eliminating the welfare loss (see Appendix for 
details).  
Proposition 4 outlines the conditions for V  and I  such that the welfare loss can be 
eliminated (i.e., the first-best allocation can be achieved). 
Proposition 4: 
If 
* ( ) ( )V V V V
I
p
b w c p w c
b c

       

or if 
* ( ) ( ) ,
( )
I I V
I I
V
b p w c c p c
p
b w c
  
   
  
 
then the first-best allocation can be achieved. 
If 
*
V Vc  or 
* ,I Ic  then the social planner will tax the administrative cost for 
verification or collecting the rebate and alternatively if 
*
V Vc  or 
* ,I Ic   then the social 
planner will subsidize the respective cost.  
3.5.2 Payment Schemes Based on Transfer Payment Functions   
In this section we assume that the payment scheme for eliminating the welfare loss is 
based on assigning a transfer function between the two parties.  Let R be a transfer 
134 
 
payment function from the manufacturer to the payer for every patient with a given π 
resulting in ˆpV for the payer’s payoff and ˆMV for the manufacturer’s profit.   
Proposition 5 states the conditions for the existence of a transfer payment function R that 
will result in ˆ ˆ CP MV V S  (and hence eliminate the welfare loss), where 
CS  is given by 
equation (4).  
Proposition 5: 
Let 1 2R Q Q    be the transfer payment function from the manufacturer to the payer 
for every patient with a given π, and 1Q  and 2Q are functions of α and .p  If 1Q p and 
2 ,Q w p p    then ˆ ˆ .
C
P MV V S   
After making the transfer payment of ,R  we obtain the following profit function for the 
manufacturer:
 1 2ˆ ( ) ( (1 ) ) ( ) . (5)
U
M
L
V p Q p w Q f d            
Incorporating 1Q p  and 2Q w p p    in (5) results in ˆ 0.MV   To guarantee that 
the manufacturer receives some arbitrary profit of 
~ ,MV  the total transfer payment function 
from the manufacturer to the payer needs to be defined as in the following: 
1
~( ) .
CR ML
T R f d V      
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The total transfer function RT  is non-increasing in α, i.e., 
 
1
( ) 0.
CR L
T p p f d          This implies that for lower rebate rates, RT is 
positive and thus the transfer payment is from the manufacture to the payer. RT  may 
become negative for higher α, in which case the transfer payment is reversed from the 
payer to the manufacturer.  
Proposition 5 also implies that by introducing R (and subsequently )RT it is possible to 
reverse the perverse incentive policy of treating patients with lower probabilities of 
response to the normal policy of treating patients with higher probability of response (i.e., 
from * 0L  and 
*U n d  to *ˆ CL L and *ˆ 1).U   
3.6 Conclusions and Future Research 
In this chapter I examined the performance of a pharmaceutical risk-sharing agreement 
between a payer and a drug manufacturer. My model generalizes on Barros (2011) by 
allowing the rebate to be different from 100% as well as by including two separate 
administrative costs. Allowing the rebate to be different from the price of the drug 
enabled me to explore the policy implications associated with different ranges of the 
rebate rate. Specifically, I showed that setting a large rebate rate generates a perverse 
incentive in which the optimal policy is to treat patients with lower probabilities of 
response.     
I included administrative costs associated with invoicing the rebate for the following 
reasons. First, the task of invoicing the rebate is time-consuming and labour intensive. 
Second, failure to do so could incur a considerable loss to the payer as outlined in a report 
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on the implementation of a number of risk-sharing agreements in the UK (Williamson, 
2009).  
I sought to answer two important policy questions. The first is whether the payer benefits 
from the risk-sharing agreement. My results show that the optimal expected payoff of the 
payer is decreasing in the rebate rate when the rebate rate is less than a certain threshold.  
Under this condition the payer does not benefit from an increase in the rebate rate. This is 
because as the rebate rate increases, the drug manufacturer also increases the price in 
order to offset the associated loss. On the other hand, when the rebate rate is greater than 
the respective threshold, the payer’s payoff is increasing in the rebate rate. This is owing 
to the fact that for large rebate rates, the optimal decision for the payer would be to treat 
patients who are less likely to respond.   
The second policy question is whether the risk-sharing agreement is welfare-improving. 
We find that, depending on the administrative costs as well as the shape of the 
distribution for the probability of response, there is a range of rebate rates where the risk-
sharing agreement is welfare-improving. Specifically, I showed that as administrative 
costs are reduced and/or the variability in the probability of response increases 
(regardless of the shape of the distribution), the risk-sharing agreement becomes welfare-
improving for a wider range of rebate rates in comparison with no risk-sharing. Also for a 
given variability in the probability of response, the risk-sharing agreement becomes 
welfare-improving at a smaller rebate rate when the density of the probability of response 
is left-skewed because a left-skewed distribution induces a higher number of responding 
patients to be treated.  
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I investigated how to eliminate the welfare loss by imposing taxes, by paying subsidies, 
or through an appropriately designed contract. The latter establishes a new transfer 
payment function between the payer and the manufacturer (in addition to the rebate), 
which maximizes the social welfare while the payer obtains the optimal value for the 
payoff and the manufacturer maintains a reservation profit. A positive transfer payment 
from the manufacturer to the payer implies that the existing rebate scheme is too small to 
coordinate the supply chain, whereas a negative transfer payment implies that the rebate 
is too large to coordinate the chain.  
There are many directions for future research. The model used in this chapter can be 
extended in a number of ways. I assumed that the rebate rate is fixed and exogenously 
given to the payer. One extension to the analysis is to assume that the rebate rate is a 
decision variable for the payer along with the cut-off probabilities, or that the rebate rate 
is a negotiated quantity. I assumed that the costs Vc and Ic are both incurred by the payer. 
A second extension would be to consider that proportions of these costs are incurred by 
the drug manufacture.  
In this chapter I modeled uncertainty in the probability of the response of each patient to 
the drug. Parameter uncertainty could also be introduced to the model by assuming that 
the parameters of the probability distribution of the probability of response are uncertain 
(i.e., hyper-parameters) (Gelman et al., 2004). Furthermore, the monetary benefit of the 
drug, b, and the administrative costs, Vc  and ,Ic  could also be other sources of 
uncertainty to be incorporated in the model. Finally, I assumed that the verification 
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process is perfect. In reality, verification is likely to be done by an imperfect test. Thus, 
another extension would be to consider error in the verification process.   
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Appendix to Chapter 3 
Derivation of L* and U* for d≥n>0 
 
 
*
*
* * * *
The payoff of the payer for an uncertain  is given by:
( ) .
To find the optimal ,  we establish the first order condition:
0  ( ) 0  0  1 for 0.
In the
U
P
L
P
L L
V d n f d
L
V n
d L n f L d L n L d n
L d

  

  

              


 
 
*
*
2
2
2
* * *
2
*
*
 following, we check whether  is a maximizer:
( ) '( );  
At  0 ( ) 0 for 0.
Thus  is the maximizer for . 
To find the optimal ,  we check the
P
P
L L
P
n
L
d
V
d f L d L n f L
L
n V
L d L n d f L d
d L
n
L V
d
U



     


          


 
*
 first derivative of :
( ) 0 for  (since 0)
 is non-decreasing in . Since 1   1.
P
P
P
V
V n
d U n f U U d n
U d
n
V U U U
d

       

   
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Derivation of L* and U* for d<0 and n<0 
 
 
*
*
* *
The payoff of the payer for an uncertain  is given by:
( ) .
To find the optimal ,  we establish the first order condition:
0  ( *) 0 0;
for 0 and 0,  if , 
U
P
L
P
U U
V
V d n f d
U
V
d U n f U d U n
U
d n p b c

  

  

        

   

 
 
*
* *
*
2
2
2
* * *
2
*
i.e., 0,  then 1. 
Thus,  0 results in  for 0.
To check whether  is the maximizer:
( ) '( );
at  0 ( ) 0 for 0.
Thus,  is the 
P
P
U U
n
d n
d
n
d U n U d n
d
n
U
d
V
d f U d U n f U
U
n V
U d U n d f U d
d U
n
U
d

  
     


    


         

 maximizer for  0. d n 
 
*
For 0 and 0,  if  , i.e., 0,  then 1. 
 is the maximizer for  as shown above and 1 for 0.
Thus,  is increasing in ,0 1 for 0 1  for 0.
V
P
P
n
d n p b c n d
d
n n
V n d
d d
V U U n d U n d
      
  
       
 
This concludes my proof for *U , i.e., the optimal decision for the payer is to choose 
*U n d for 0,d n  or * 1U  for 0.n d   
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 
*
*
To find the optimal ,  we check the first derivative of :
( ) 0 for  (since 0 and 0)
 is decreasing in .  Since 0   0.
P
P
P
L V
V n
d L n f L L d n
L d
n
V L L L
d

        

   
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
For 0n   and 0,d   we need to show that if ,n d  then 
 
1
0
( ) 0:  PV d n f d     
1
0
1
0
Since 0,  it follows from 0 that  ( ) 0  
( ) 0    . 
Q.E.D.
P
n
d V f d
d
n n n
f d
d d d
 
  
    

     
 

      
 

  
Proof of Lemma 1 
* *
* *
For  and =1 when <  (i.e.,  when 1 or 
 and  when 1< ) or for 0 and  when 
1
1<  (i.e.,  and ) :
1
T V
I V I
V T
V I I
T V
V I
I
n
L U p b c
d
b c c c n
p p b c L U
d
c c b c
p p b c
p p c cn
b p cd
p
  
 
 
 
 


   
 
      

 
    

          

 
 
2
* *
/( )
;    0 if ( ) >0
( )
/ 
or alternatively if < . Thus,  0   < ,  that is 
 is increasing in  for <  and  is increasing in  for ,  1<
V I
V I
I
I
T T
V
T
n db b c c
b b c c
p b p c p
n db c
b c p
n n
L p U p
d d



   
   

       
   

  
 
  .T
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* *
* *
For  and =1 when >  (i.e., and ) or 
1
for 0 and  when >  (i.e., and ):
1
( )  
0 if ( ) <0  or alternatively if >    
(
V I I
T V
I V I
T V
I
V I T
V
n c c b c
L U p p b c
d
n b c c c
L U p p b c
d
n d b c
b b c c
p b c
 
 
 
 
  
 
    

 
     

 
     
 

*
* *) 0   > ,  that is  or  is decreasing in  for > .
Q.E.D.
T T
n d n n
L U p
p d d
      

 
Proof of Proposition 2 
For L n d and 1,U   if ( ) ( ),V I Iw c c b c     then ( ) ( ) 0.I V Ib c w c c    
Thus, 0S  for ( ) ( ).V I IL w c c b c     On the other hand for 0L  and ,U n d  if 
( ) ( ),V I Iw c c b c     then ( ) ( ) 0.I V Ib c w c c      Thus, 0S  for 
( ) ( ).V I IU w c c b c     
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 3 
Let 
* *
0( , )PV p denote the optimal payoff of the payer when the price is fixed at
*
0 ,p  i.e., 
  
*
*
* * * * *
0 0 0 0( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ,
U
P V I V
L
V p b p c p c p c f d             where
*L and 
*U  are as shown in Table 3-2 for the given price *
0 .p  Let 0K  denote the fixed value for 
* *
0( , )PV p  when 0,  0,Vc   and 0,Ic   i.e.,   *
0
1
* *
0 0 0( ) (1 ) ( ) ,
L
K b p p f d        
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where 
*
* 0
0 .
p
L
b
  Let 1K denote the fixed value for 
* *
0( , )PV p  when 0,  i.e., 
  *
1
1
* *
1 0 0( ) (1 ) ( ) ,V I V
L
K b p c p c c f d           where 
*
* 0
1 .
V I
I
p c c
L
b c
 


  
First we show that 0 1 :K K Since 
*
0( ) ,V I Ib c c p c   adding 
*
0bp  to the both sides of this 
inequality yields * *
0 0( ) ( ).V I Ib p c c p b c    By rearranging the latter inequality we 
obtain 
* *
1 0.L L  Therefore 0K  can be rewritten as in the following: 
   
*
1
* *
0 1
1
* * * *
0 0 0 0 0( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ,
L
L L
K b p p f d b p p f d                or 
alternatively,    
*
1
* *
0 1
1
* * *
0 0 0 0( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) .
L
L L
K b p f d b p p f d              Since the 
first component in 
0K  is always positive and Vc and Ic both appear with negative signs in 
the integrand for 
1,K thus 0 1.K K  
Now we show that 
* *
0( , )PV p is increasing in α by taking its derivative using Leibniz 
integral rule:  When 
* *
* 0 0
*
0
V I
I
p p c c
L
b p c


  

 
and * 1,U   
*
* *
1
*0
0
( , )
(1 ) ( ) 0.P
L
V p
p f d

  


  
 
 
(Note that for   
*
1
* *
0 0 0( , ) ( ) ,P
L
V p d n f d       where 
* *
0 0 0 V In p p c c     and 
*
0 0 ,Id b p c   the term    0 0 0 0 0 0 0d n d n f n d    in the respective Leibniz 
formula).  
144 
 
On the other hand when 
* 0L   and 
* *
* 0 0
*
0
,V I
I
p p c c
U
b p c


  

 
 due to the similar reason 
given above, 
** *
*0
0
0
( , )
(1 ) ( ) 0.
U
PV p p f d

  


  
 
 Thus, 
* *
0( , )PV p is increasing in α 
for the fixed price
*
0 .p  This in turn implies that 
* *
1 0 2 0( , ) ( , )P PV p V p   1 2.    
Next we show that * *
0lim ( , ) :PV p



  For large α, both components * *
0 0 V Ip p c c  
and *
0 Ib p c   become negative. Thus from Table 3-2, as , 
* 0L  and
* *
* 0 0
*
0
.V I
I
p p c c
U
b p c


  

 
 On the other hand, 
* *
* 0 0
*
0
lim lim 1.V I
I
p p c c
U
b p c 

 
  
 
 
Thus, 
  
1
* * * * *
0 0 0 0
0
lim ( , ) lim ( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) .P V I VV p b p c p c p c f d
 
     
 
          
Since 0 1K K  and 
* *
0 1( , )PV p K  0,   for some arbitrary 1 0  one of the following 
cases can happen:  i) 
* *
1 0 0( , ) ,PV p K   ii) 
* *
1 0 0( , ) ,PV p K  or iii) 
* *
1 0 0( , ) .PV p K    
i) If 
* *
1 0 0( , ) ,PV p K   then 1F  such that 
* *
0 0( , )PV p K  F   and 
*
0 0( , )PV p K  .F    
ii) If 
* *
1 0 0( , ) ,PV p K  then there is a threshold 1F   such that 
* *
0 0( , )P FV p K   
and 
* *
0 0( , )PV p K   .F     
iii) If 
* *
1 0 0( , ) ,PV p K   then since
* *
0lim ( , ) ,PV p



 there is a threshold 1F   
such that 
* *
0 0( , )P FV p K  and 
* *
0 0( , )PV p K   .F    
Q.E.D. 
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Lemma 2 
*L n d is decreasing in α and 
*U n d  is increasing in α.  
Proof of Lemma 2 
*
2
For  (i.e.,   for 1  or  
min{( ),( ) ,( ) ( 1)} for >1):
( ) ( )
;     if < ,  then ( )<0; 
( )
( )
since 0   < ,  and  is the necessary con
V
V I V I
V
V V
I
V V
n
L p b c
d
p b c b c c c
n d p p b c
p b c p b c
b p c
n d
p b c p b c

  
 

   
    
  
   
  

    

* *
dition on  
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for 1):
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for the case of , thus  is increasing in .
Q.E.D.
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Derivation of Optimal V  
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max  = ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,
             = ( ) ( ) ( )
ˆˆ ˆwhere = ,  ( )
ˆ
V
V
C
I V I V V
L L
I V I
L
V
S b c w c f d c f d
b c w c c f d
n
L n p
d


      
  

     
   

 

 
*
* *
* *
*
ˆ( ( ) ),  and ( ( ) ).
ˆ
ˆ ˆ: 0 ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) 0 ,where .
ˆNow we investigate if  satisfies the second order conditi
V V I V I
C
I V I
V V
C C V I
I V I
I
C
p c d b p c
S L
FOC b c L w c c f L
w c c
b c L w c c L L L
b c
L L
    
 
     
 
        
 
 
       


*
2
2 *
*
2
ˆ
*
on:
ˆ
ˆ( ) ( ) 0.
ˆThus,  is the condition for the imposed  to be the maximizer.
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Proof of Proposition 4 
The following equations can be derived from ( ) ( ) :
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) (
V V V
I
V I V I V
V I V I I I V I I
V I I I I V I
p
b w c p w c
b c
b c p b w c b c p w c
b c p b w c c c b c p w c c c
b c p b c p c b c p w c c b


 
 
  
     

        
            
           
   
*
)( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ˆ,  i.e., .
( )
I V I
I V I V I I
CV I V I
I I
c w c c
b c p p c w c c b p c
p p c w c c
L L
b p c b c
  
 

  
         
    
 
  
  
On the other hand, we showed earlier in the Appendix under the “Derivation of Optimal
V ” that when 
*ˆ ,CL L  then the social welfare is maximized. Thus, if 
* ( ) ( ),V V V V
I
p
b w c p w c
b c

       

 then *ˆ ,CL L  and consequently the social 
welfare is maximized (i.e., the first-best allocation can be achieved). 
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We also showed earlier in the Appendix under the “Derivation of Optimal
I ” that when 
* ,CL L  then the social welfare is maximized. Thus, if 
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 then * ,CL L and consequently the social 
welfare is maximized (i.e., the first-best allocation can be achieved). 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 5 
From (1) and (2) we have:
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After making the transfer payment of 1 2R Q Q    for every patient with a given π, 
we obtain the following equations for the payer’s payoff and the manufacturer’s profit:
 
 
1 2
1 2
ˆ ( ) ( ) ( ) ,
ˆ ( ) ( (1 ) ) ( ) .
U
P
L
U
M
L
V d Q n Q f d
V p Q p w Q f d
  
    
    
      


 
Let *ˆL  and *Uˆ  be the optimal cut-off probabilities for ˆ .PV To obtain 
ˆ ˆ ,CP MV V S   the 
following conditions should be fulfilled: *ˆ CL L and 
*ˆ 1,U   where 
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We insert 1Q p  and 2Q w p p    in 
*ˆL  and obtain the following result: 
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Thus, if 1Q p  and 2 ,Q w p p    then 
*ˆ CL L and consequently ˆ ˆ .CP MV V S   
This in turn implies that a social planner can eliminate the welfare loss by choosing the 
transfer payment of 1 2,Q Q   where 1Q p and 2 .Q w p p    
Q.E.D. 
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Calculation of Optimal Price under Uniform Distribution 
We assume that π is uniformly distributed such that f(π)=1, 0≤π≤1. By incorporating this 
assumption in (1) and (2), the following equations are obtained for PV and :MV
( ) ( ) , (A-1)
2
( ) ( ) , (A-2)
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where ( ),Id b p c   ( ).V In p c p c     The optimal values for L and U, i.e., 
*L
and *,U are given according to the respective scenarios shown in Table 3-2.  
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*L n d and * 1,U   the following equation is obtained for the profit of the 
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2
M
n p n
V p w p
d d



      
 
Then the first order 
condition for the manufacturer’s profit, ∂VM/∂p=0, results in the following cubic function: 
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Solving for the roots of the above cubic function will yield the optimal price when π is 
uniformly distributed. 
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Calculation of Optimal Price for a Known π 
For a known π, we obtain the following equation for the payer’s payoff: ,PV d n    
where 
V In p p c c    and .Id b p c    The drug manufacture chooses the 
optimal price such that 0.PV  Therefore: 
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On the other hand for a known π, we have the following equation for the profit of the 
manufacturer: (1 ).MV p w p      MV  is increasing in p if 1 (1 ) 0.    Thus for 
a known π: *
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 For 1 (1 ) 0,    0MV  if 
p<0 which is not feasible. For 1 (1 ) 0,     the optimal price will become infinite.  
From the above equation for the optimal price for a known π, we obtain the following 
optimal price for :IT
V
b c
b c
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
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* .Vp b c   This result, which is consistent with the 
results obtained from the numerical examples, implies that for ,T 
*p  is independent 
of π. 
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Conclusions 
This thesis set out to examine the complex dynamics arising from health-based 
pharmaceutical pay-for-performance risk-sharing agreements by focusing on the 
performance of two distinct types of such agreements. In the first type, the response of 
patients to a new drug is evaluated at an evaluation time specified in the contract. In the 
second type, patients are prescribed the drug only if their probability of response to the 
drug lies within a range of probabilities of success. The payer determines this range such 
that the use of the drug becomes cost-effective. In both types of agreements, the 
pharmaceutical firm provides the payer with a rebate for patients who do not respond to 
the drug. 
In the first type of agreement each patient takes the drug over a number of time periods 
and stops taking the drug as the disease progresses. Also, the proportion of non-
responding patients who are subject to the rebate is a function of the evaluation time. 
Because of these time-dependent properties, I chose a Poisson process in the context of a 
continuous time Markov chain to model patients’ response to the drug. On the contrary, 
in the second type of agreement each patient takes the drug from the beginning of a time 
period, and her or his response is also evaluated in the same time period. Thus, I chose a 
simple Bernoulli distribution to model the stochastic response of a patient to the drug. 
However, I enriched the model with heterogeneity of response within the patient 
population by assuming a probability distribution for the probability of response.  
In Chapter 1 of this thesis I studied the performance of the first type of agreement from 
the perspective of the drug manufacturer. In Chapter 2, I extended the model developed 
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in the first chapter and examined the performance of the agreement from the payer’s 
perspective. In Chapter 3, I studied the performance of the second type of agreement 
from the perspective of a social planner in addition to the perspectives of the payer and 
the drug manufacturer. In the first two chapters the rebate rate and the evaluation time are 
the decision variables, while the price of the drug is fixed (e.g., set by an external process 
or regulators). In the third chapter, I assumed that in addition to the rebate rate and cut-off 
probabilities, the price of the drug is also a decision variable. 
Main Insights From the Thesis 
In the following I describe a few important findings from this thesis that can be 
applicable across different types of performance-based risk-sharing agreements. The 
results from this study demonstrate that optimal or feasible solutions for the payer or the 
drug manufacturer are not obvious. These results also highlight the trade-offs in 
negotiating these agreements. The analytical results supported by numerical examples in 
all three chapters show that, in many instances, the manufacturer’s profit and the payer’s 
payoff are non-monotonic for these agreements.   
There are also two important findings from the policy perspective. First, setting a high 
rebate rate (usually greater than 100%) could potentially lead to a perverse incentive 
policy, in which treating patients who are least likely to respond to the drug becomes the 
optimal solution. Second, generally it is not possible to achieve a socially optimal 
contract by establishing only a rebate transfer payment from the manufacturer to the 
payer based on a performance-based risk-sharing agreement. Achieving this goal may 
also require taxes to be imposed, subsidies to be paid, or appropriate transfer payment 
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functions other than the rebate to be designed between the payer and the drug 
manufacturer.  
By showing some promising results in practice, the bortezomib agreement has paved the 
way for more risk-sharing agreements to be implemented for similar types of treatments 
(e.g., the agreement for lenalidomide for the treatment of multiple myeloma in the UK). 
The analytical and numerical results in the first and second chapters of this thesis also 
confirm the existence of feasible solutions for both the payer and the manufacturer under 
such an agreement. Theoretically, it is possible to achieve more robust results by adding 
more complexity to the structure of these agreements. However the trade-off is that it 
may also make their administration more difficult and more costly. (This phenomenon is 
demonstrated in Chapter 2 when comparing different rebate classifications for the same 
agreement.)  
My research on pharmaceutical risk-sharing has the following limitations. First, 
throughout this study I have been looking only into two specific types of performance-
based risk-sharing agreements. In reality, depending on the treatment type and the 
contract parameters, risk-sharing agreements could become very different from one 
another from a structural point of view. This in turn implies that there is no universal 
solution or gold standard for these types of agreements. 
Second, the main objective sought from risk-sharing in this study is to prevent the risk of 
paying for an unsuccessful outcome (i.e., type I error). Therefore, examining any further 
objectives for risk-sharing, such as increasing patient access to new treatments under a 
limited budget or maintaining the incentive for drug manufacturers to introduce new 
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drugs, has been out of the scope of this thesis (Pugatch et al., 2010). However, I believe 
that the results from this study can also be used in any future research that examines such 
objectives.  
Third, risk-sharing is in its early stages of existence. Therefore it is too early to make any 
judgement with regard to its future, i.e., whether it is going to be a staple feature of 
pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement policies or whether it is a temporary solution 
for an imminent problem. 
Future Research 
As explained earlier in this chapter, I narrowed the objective sought by performance-
based risk-sharing to preventing risk of type I error for the payer. A direction for broader 
future research would be to examine the performance of these or other types of risk-
sharing agreements with regard to further objectives such as cost controlling, increasing 
patient access to new treatments under limited budgets, or improving the incentive for 
drug manufacturers to introduce new drugs. 
A recent financial analysis indicates a lower average profit margin for the health 
insurance sector compared with that of major drug manufacturers in 2012, i.e., 4.5%  
versus 16.7% , respectively (Aetna, 2013). Investigating the correlation between low 
average profit margin for the payers and their reluctance to cover new expensive drugs is 
by itself the subject of a separate study. However, envisioning the existence of such a 
correlation inspires the following future research with regard to the pharmaceutical risk-
sharing modeling. We can assume the likelihood of covering a drug without risk-sharing 
is a function of the payer’s expected profit margin and can thus incorporate it in the risk-
157 
 
sharing model. The impact of this likelihood can be further analyzed on the expected 
value of the payer’s payoff or the manufacturer’s profit. 
Investigating the performance of other types of pharmaceutical risk-sharing agreements is 
another direction for future research. For example, since 2002 there has been an on-going 
risk-sharing agreement between the UK government and several drug manufacturers for 
beta interferon and glatiramer acetate for the treatment of multiple sclerosis (MS). This 
agreement allows the coverage of these drugs conditional on a 10-year monitoring study 
to collect data on the progression of disease in treated patients. According to this scheme, 
the collected data would be reviewed every two years and, based on the effectiveness 
results for each individual drug, the drug manufacturers  agreed to adjust the drug price to 
the National Health Service (Boggild et al., 2009; HSC, 2002). When the results from the 
first two years came out in 2009, they created controversial views among experts on the 
performance of this specific scheme. Some called it a costly failure (Raftery, 2010) or 
argued that continuing the scheme was unjustified (McCabe et al., 2010), while some 
decided that it was too early to reach any conclusion about the cost-effectiveness of those 
treatments based on this first interim analysis (Boggild et al., 2009). These discussions 
justify the need for more thorough analyses of the performance of such agreements. The 
results from such studies can be used for designing optimal risk-sharing schemes for 
other new drugs for the treatment of MS or other diseases with a similar course of 
treatment. 
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